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Abstract 
The present study attempts to provide a preliminary examination of the 
following specific question: in the socio-political context of late-transitional Hong 
Kong, under what specific situations will liberal political organizations, driven 
by strategic elites, likely to enter into cooperation, remain indifferent or go into 
conflict with each other? Two parties are selected for comparative case studies. 
In sum, five tentative explanations are presented here. Primarily, the genital and 
ideological factors are dropped for their false assumption about the relation 
betweem common interest and collective action. Socio-cultural and politico-
institutional factors are then partially employed as background variables. They 
are still over-generalized aiid over-deterministic to provide a comprehensive 
account. Ultimately, an institutional-choice approach is adopted, which will 
concentrate oil the power dynamics and context-specific interactions among 
political organizations responsible for shaping their interrelationships. Three 
basic dimensions - external threats and opportunities, inter-organizational 
linkages and problems of mobilization are extensively dealt with (see Appendix 
I). Both the. effects of internal and external environmental opportunities or 
constraints on the adaptive modes of political organizations will be emphasized. 
Conceptually, the insights of rational choice theory and resource mobilization 
theory will also be largely utilized. 
I. Introduction 
1. Objective 
In this study, the following questions are attempted to be examined: 
First, under the present institutional constraints, how will the strategic 
choices of political leaders shape the interrelationships among the liberal 
political organizations in Hong Kong? 
Second, specifically, under what external and internal conditions are the 
political organizations, driven by rational political actors, likely to enter into 
cooperation, remain independent and indifferent from or go into conflict and 
competition with each other? 
Third, in other words, how do we conceptualize, with the knowledge of 
macro-political circumstances, the divergent phenomenon of .political alignments 
as well as fragmentation and division多 among the liberal political organizations? 
What is tried to offered here is a preliminary and exploratory study. A 
conceptual framework，serving as an analytical tool and suggests partial answers 
to the above problems, will be developed. It will then be illustrated by one or 
two empirical case studies (Meeting Point and Association for Democracy and 
People's Livelihood). The limitations are apparent, partially due to the evolving 
and emerging character of the subject matter and partially due to the covered 
nature of much political reality. 
2. Empirical Problems 
. ‘. : : . 1 
The democratic movement in Hong Kong has for long been described as 
lack of mass support, shallow in ideological content and suffering from 
fragmentation and division (see Lau, 1987 and 1990a, also refer to my own 
senior thesis on S.T.D.B., Chow, 1990). The former can be accounted by the 
loose organization, the inward-looking and self-seeking mentality, as well as the 
general feeling of political apathy and powerlessness among the local populace 
(Lau and Kuan, 1986a). While the next is not only a direct result of the 
instrumental orientation, the satisfaction in economic life and present colonial 
administration of the people, but also due to the impossibility of independence 
and the fluidic and paradoxical political situation faced by Hong Kong. In sum, 
there is no urgent ideological issues which have much political market (see Lau, 
1988). The cause for the last phenomenon is, however, far more complicated. 
Aroused political aspiration arid intensive power competition is probably the 
most straight-forward and logical argument, but the structural conditions and its 
interaction with the subtle power dynamics probably need far more detail 
examination, as proposed in this study. 
With the gradual open up of the political system, the introduction of 
territorial elections and the development of parliamentary politics, the 
, consolidation of movement organization and the formation of political parties 
becomes inevitable. The demarcation of them and pressure groups also becomes 
identifiable. Although the process is far from completed, and the continual 
decomposition and recomposition of various political forces is totally expected, 
the，organization，factor still has growing significance when compared with the 
，individual，factor in political representation. The development of political 
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organizations, including their consolidation of leaders, strengthening of 
membership and organization, clarification of stands, are all important issues 
and have important consequences to the political system. Undeniably, one of 
the most crucial issues which must be encountered by the political organizations 
is the strategies in facing the multi-organizational environment. Who are the 
friends and who are the enemies? What kind of power balance has to be 
maintained for organizational survival? All these must be considered especially 
when fragmentation and division is still prevailing, the co-existence of multiple 
organizations is unavoidable and no single organization is able to monopolize 
the political space available. In short, the opposite trends of alliance and 
organization formation, as well as the remaining isolation and atomization is 
both of the core problems in understanding the development of political 
organizations1. 
3* Theoretical concern 
How Tsr^  interorganizational relationships conceptualized? What is meant 
by cooperation and conflict among political organizations? Most generally, the 
two dimensions are fundamental problematics in sociological theorizing. 
Functional and conflict��paradigms basically dispute over the 
integrative/consensual or conflictual/coercive nature built in the constitution of 
society. However, the relevance of the two perspectives to this, study is minimal 
for their macro-societal level of concern as well as their apriori predispositions 
in either the cooperation or conflict dimensions. What seems more consistent 
to the present emphasis on strategic interaction is exchange theory, which adopts 
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a micro-behavioural as well as relatively mechanistic and materialistic view of 
social life. Blau (1964)，for instance, outlines both transactions for rewards and 
competition for social recognition as emergent properties of elementary, 
interpersonal exchanges, as well as integration/consolidation of leadership and 
. opposition/conflict as divergent features of more structured, formal social 
relationships. In either cases, power differentiation and its exercise are essential 
building blocks of the theory. 
From a more economistic tradition, rational choice theory carries similar 
orientations but even further stresses on the individualistic and calculative 
nature of human action, especially under highly institutionalized and formalistic 
social context, e.g. the market situation. Hechter (1983) and Coleman (1986 and 
1990) are probably its representatives in the domain of sociology. A major sub-
field of rational choice theory deals with interacting individuals is known as 
game theory. One typical game situation involving non-zero sum outcomes is the 
prisoners' dilemma, in which players can choose either cooperation or defection 
strategy, interdepenciently determines the contingent gain or loss of each other 
(see e.g. Elster, 1986). Such logic has significant impact on sociology especially 
in studies of collective action and social movement, specifically via the work of 
Olson (1965), � 
The resources mobilization theory, a direct intellectual succession from 
this stream, will be extensively employed in this study. More concretely and 
specifically, the interrelationships of，social movement organizations' (SMOs) is 
characterized by Zald and McCarthy (1980, p.2) in the follow manner2: 
丨丨…a variety of SMOs or groups, linked to various 
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segment of supporting constitutions, competing 
amongst themselves for resources and symbolic 
leadership, sharing facilities and resources at other 
times, developing stable and many times 
differentiated functions, occasionally merging into 
unified ad hoc coalitions and occasionally engaging 
in all-out war against each other." 
Base on such characterizations, more refined and elaborated 
conceptualizations can be developed. First of all, interrelationships of political 
organizations can broadly be dichotomized into the cooperation and conflict 
dimensions, while organizations with little or no interaction are independent and 
indifferent from each other. After all, cooperation is defined as relationship 
based on mutually accommodative and beneficial behaviour. On the contraiy, 
conflict is defined as relationship based on mutually offensive and depriving 
behaviour. While competition can be conceived as a moderate form of conflict 
under regulation and involves relatively little feelings of hostility and 
antagonism. 
Second, either cooperation or conflict can be further differentiated as 
explicit and implicit in nature. .The former denotes relationship involving direct 
... « 
contact and communication, while the latter involves no overt gestures and 
merely indicates individual, uncoordinated behaviour responding to the 
behaviour of others. In general, the latter can be identified as a lesser form of 
cooperation and conflict. 
Third and most importantly, both cooperation and conflict can vary in 
、 ：、 5 . 
degree of intensity3. Logically, the extreme form of cooperation among political 
organizations is merger. Other possibilities include formation of federations and 
cartels, enduring coalitions, ad hoc alliances or joint working groups, shared 
resources on particular events, formation of united fronts on particular issues or 
joint press, or merely exchanges of information and opinion, etc., with intensity 
in descending order. At the same time, the extreme form of conflict will 
probably be physical violence, while is not yet observed in Hong Kong. Other 
possibilities include enduring inter-group hostilities and overt mass 
confrontations, employments of disruptive and constraint tactics or other forms 
of collective actions directed towards each other, formations of oppositional 
fronts or parliamentary factions, verbal attacks or opinion war, or merely 
peaceful competitions for scarce resources under constitutional rules and 
regulations, e.g. through voting and elections, etc. 
What then accounts for the interrelationships of political organizations? 
Why do they cooperate or conflict with each other? Five possible explanations 
are presented here. 
Genital Factor 
It is asserted that the liberal political organizations have their origins in 
social movement dated back to the 70，s，which are pluralistic in claims and 
discontinual in organization. They are predominated by single-issue groups which 
experience factionalism and individualism (see Lee, 1989). Such characteristics 
are thus inherit to and greatly affecting the present organizational conditions. 
Such account probably points out some important facts. However, it is a 
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description rather than explanation. It does not spell out the mechanism which 
perpetuate that situations, especially when the general socio-political 
environment has been completely altering throughout the time. Furthermore, 
there seems little deep-seeded cleavages and conflict dimensions which are 
unresolvable and accumulating. The intensified conflicts and competitions clearly 
observable appear after rather than before the initiation of decolonization and 
democratization. In short, such explanation hints to the structural weakness of 
political organizations in general but fails to provide a more dynamic perspective 
about the interactions among them. 
Ideological factor 
Such explanation emphasizes the divergent values and beliefs held by the 
political leaders which leads to fragmentation and division among political 
organizations. Above all, the attitude towards China and class positions are two, 
if not all aspects of dispute (see Lui, 1989; Cheng, 1989). Such descensus is 
further deepened by the evolving political process and conflicts over specific 
issues. However, such account has also its weakness. For the first thing, such 
account is incompatible with the general fact of instrumentalism and pragmatism 
which spread over the local; politics and society as a whole. Ideological 
differences is minimal even across the liberals and conservatives (Lau, 1988). 
Neither are the so-called cleavages have their socio-structural origins and mass 
bases. No apparent disjunction is able to be observed even on the most 
controversial and polarizing issues of 'June-fourth incident，among the liberals. 
What makes difference is only the style of appeal and strategic considerations, 
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in which the radical counterpart is also limited by political reality and facing 
unsolvable dilemmas, gradually shifting from the original positions. 
Moreover, it is unable to differentiate such factors as the causes or 
rather consequences of political conflicts. Leaders may, for the sake of internal 
cohesion and undermining opponents, exaggerate the minor disagreements . . �, 
among them. The invalidity of normative dimensions to organization distances 
is also displayed by the fact of loose organization discipline, fluidic and 
overlapping membership. Sometimes, the internal diversity of membership 
background is even greater than across groups. Therefore, ideology is largely a 
kind of self-label and justification for actions, which although exists, is not 
essentially internalized and committed by the leaders as it，should，be (see Zald 
and McCarthy, 1977, p.1215). 
The two foregoing accounts in fact have several commonalities. First, 
both provide factual descriptions of some partial phenomena rather than 
theoretical explanations that underline such surface manifestations. Second, both 
focus on the conflict dimension, but nothing is said on the tendencies of 
alliances and cooperations. 
•' • • - - ... •丄-• .. . 
Third and. most important of all, there seems behind the both 
explanations a common assumption: that divergent goals and values (be it 
differences in issue^concerns or ideological positions) give rise to fragmentation 
and division, thus implicitly implies that common interests should contribute to 
collective action, which was effectively challenged by Olson (1965), who points 
out the cost of participation and the "free-rider" problems of group formation. 
Drawing insights from the RMT and organization theory of the same line, we 
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can see why this is the case. As Zald & McCarthy (1980) argued, SMOs with 
similar goals are likely to compete for resources from similar adherents. 
Alternatively, as Panebianco says, "the history of relationship between socialists 
and communists in different countries is a long sequence of fierce polemics, 
which is not accidental..,.[for] the competition in laying claim to another parties 
hunting ground, threatens the latter's identity and destabilizes it." (1988, p.217). 
Stable alliances may even more likely to take place among ideologically distant 
organizations. Branches of new social movement, for instance, are found to be 
closely connected with traditional trade unions and religious groups 
(Klandermans, 1990). In general, under such conceptions, collective actions are 
fandamentallv treated as problematic, while the rational and power-seeking 
nature of political actions are emphasized. Based on these, two divergent 
explanations which focus on the larger socio-political context are put forward. 
Socio-cultural factor 
In the broadjsense，the poorly organized society and weak class structures 
(Lau, 1987) as well as the political apathetic and instrumental outlook of the 
mass supply limited support for the political organizations. The Status-quo 
orientation and lack of urgent ideological issues also m^ke mobilization 
extremely difficult, thus induces throat-cutting competition for audiences. In a 
narrower sense, the leaders themselves inherit the kind of individualistic and 
calculative character, who rush into the political game aggressively and short-
sightedly, especially under the constraint of time (Lau, 1990a), making 
compromises and consensus difficult (Chapter II). 
. • 9 
Politico-institutional factor 
The future of the political system is laid down by the Basic Law, which 
determine how power is allocated and the limits of political organization 
development It offers the opportunity structures which guide the action of 
political organizations as well as the rules of the game among them. In summary, 
the future system is characterized by three basic features: its semi-dependency, 
the limited and fragmented power components and limited socio-economic role 
of government (see Lau, 1988, 1990a &1991). 
All these direct to a general picture: the limited political arena, further 
bisected by diverse modes of recruitment, discourages power aggregation and 
consensus building. The political aspirants, especially stimulated by the early 
promises of，political reform，and，Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong，，are on 
the one hand forced to struggle for the limited amount of power through intense 
competition, on the other hand being divided up by the structurally fragmented 
political system. The 'disparate bases of influences' of diversely recruited leaders 
and the availability of alternative channels to them (Lau, 1990a) release their 
dependence upon political organizations or other forms of coalitions. The 
'autonomy' of the society and the economy from government intervention further 
inhibits it from extensive politicization. As a result, fragmentation and division 
is easily anticipated (Chapter III.1). 
If our attention solely focus on the liberals, however, the situation is 
slightly different. First of all, the biases of functional representation towards the 
business sector make them largely inaccessible to the liberals who adopts a 
middle-lower class approach. The disintegrating effect is not severe. Second, the 
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'autonomy of lower class socio-economic groups (which liberals based) from the 
government intervention is relatively much less. Social policy means life and 
death to them. Politicization is not unlikely to accelerate especially when the 
economy is weakening and class conflict is intensified (Chapter III.2). 
From this perspectives, the just mentioned two approaches applied to the 
liberals is still less than satisfactory. They are, on one level or another, still over-
deterministic and over-generalized, and neglect the unique situations faced by 
specific actors. As most, they are more suitable to serve as background variables. 
However, comparatively speaking, here the emphasis will be put onto the 
politico-institutional approach for，on one hand, the unchallengeable and 
enduring nature of it. This does not imply the socio-cultural elements are easily 
modifiable, but they are at least not constitutionally，fixed，and are interactive 
with the political organizations, i.e., political organization formation is both 
constituted and constitutive of the socio-cultural conditions. Qn the other hand, 
the individualistic and self-seeking orientation of political leaders, as argued 
above, is，normal，in nature and may not necessarily resulted in descensus and 
disunity, the actual outcome will depend on the external .and internal conditions 
of interaction among them. 
Institutional-choice approach 
What demands further study here is an approach which draws insights 
from the institutional constraints, at the same time integrates more detailed and 
careful examination of the power dynamics and context-specific interactions 
under which strategic choices are made by political leaders. That is to say, first 
‘ . : . . - . 11 
of all, the concept of 'rational actor' is introduced in the analytical framework, 
who are not solely reflections of environmental determinants, but are also 
capable of reading the environment and making strategic calculations4. Second, 
what the actors encounter is not only the institutional constraints, but other 
major actors in it as well. Their mutual orientations and situational contacts are 
also crucial in shaping their ultimate conflict or cooperative relationships. Third, 
the environmental constraints and opportunity structures maybe different across 
various actors at distinct time moments. Instead of treating them as identical and 
unitary, some sort of typology or differentiations is desirable. 
Fourth and most importantly, besides the external environment and other 
interacting organizations, contingencies of internal environment in terms of the 
problems of organizational maintenance and survival, especially the need to 
supply continuous inducements to arouse members， commitment and 
participation, are essential considerations affecting decision making (Wilson, 
1973). The specific intrinsic properties and limitations of particular political 
organizations, as they are being revealed in each of the following situations, have 
enormous impact and substantial political consequences on interorganizational 
relationships. 
In the light of the above, discussion, certain directions of research largely 
in line with the RMT, though tentatively formulated, are specifically applied to 
the closer examination of inter-partv relationships (Chapter IV)5: 
External threat or opportunity 
Constitutionally, the authorities (be it Britain or China) have much 
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capacity of rewarding or sanctioning the political parties. Historically, united 
front among the liberals was likely when there was exceptional common 
opportunity or threat which were not affordable by individual organizations, e.g. 
during the 'June-fourth incident'. It is hypothesized, in return, political parties 
will tend to go into conflict rather than cooperate not only because persecution 
is absent and the democratic leaders find themselves，politically and personally 
safe，(Lau, 1990a, p.37), but may also intensify if the strategy of divide and rule 
is applied on them. At the same time,，the more clear-cut and vigorous the 
counter-movements，(Zald & McCarthy，1980)- presence of strong oppositional 
political parties-the more the likelihood of alliance formation. 
Inter-organizational linkages 
The limited arena of power competition and the impossibility of capturing 
government as well as the lack of mass support and ideological base makes strict 
party line and organizational discipline problematic. Loose internal cohesion and 
weakened party's central control tolerates the continuity of interlocks and 
overlapping membership, which may promote interorganizational 
communication. However, when organization identity and problem of loyalty is 
endangered, such condition may also be harmful to inter-party relationships 
(Staggenborg, 1986). 
Problems of mobilization 
It will be asserted that the institutional limits to political insertion and the 
similarity of mobilization potentials induce conflict among political 
_ 13 . 
parties(Wilson,1973). The concentration of efforts on particular channels and 
resources promotes tensions and competition, which are intensified when 
political parties are unable to practice control over their aspirant members. Such 
antagonism will be furthered when radicalized tactics and appeals are applied 
to the same, narrow constituents ( see Lau, 1990a, p.36). 
4. Data Collection 
Indepth interviews with 18 political leaders of the chosen political parties 
as well as their revealed cooperative or conflict counterparts, are conducted. The 
interviews last from one to two hours, with several cases follow up questions are 
asked through telephone. The interviews are semi-structured, while leading 
questions are posited, spontaneous questions will be asked in responding to prior 
answers of the interviewees. The limitations are obvious, many underlying 
mechanisms and sensitive facts will be hardly uncovered. Such problems may 
partially be remedied by the employment of multiple sources of data and the 
cross-checking of contradicting data, so that even if the ultimate reality cannot 
be debunk, the issue at hand can still be clarified. Practical means include 
interviews with less committed and value laden，by standers，as well as through 
the gathering of second hand archival data of diverse sorts6. 
:..、.. . . . 1 4 
II. Players of the game: political organizations and political leaders in Hong 
Kong 
1. Historical development of the liberal political organizations: a Retrospect 
The term liberals，is commonly applied to the political leaders or 
organizations which promote the democratic movement in Hong Kong in the 
last few years. The loose cluster emerged in about 1984，when the discussion on 
political reform was initiated by the Hong Kong Government. At that time a 
'Joint Conference for the Studying of the Green Paper on Representative 
Government，was formed by 49 organizations. However, the term ‘liberals， 
became popular and the grouping began to take shape only until 1986, during 
the early debates on Basic Law. 
In response to the Group of 51 Business and Professionals, a Group of 
190 was formed, proposing a liberal model on constitutional reform, 
characterized by 'one person off vote'. Shortly after that, the Joint Committee 
for the Promotion of Democratic Government (JCPDG), consisted of over 100 
political organizations, was set up. During the prolonged course of Basic Law 
consultation, it acted as an envoy of the liberals. From 1986 onwards, the 
constitution of the grouping was by and large stable, notably headed by the so-
called ，Big Three，or Triad，- Meeting Point (MP), Hong Kong Affairs Society 
(HKAS) and the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), 
as well as Legco members Szeto Wah and Martin Lee Chu-ming. 
If the term 'liberals' is rather straight forward, the term，political 
organizations，probably demands more explanation1. In this study it refers to 
, ； 15 . . 
both political parties (or quasi-parties) and pressure groups in Hong Kong. 
Besides them exist political groups，, which may be specified as potential 
parties, are somewhat a mixture of parties and pressure groups. They are, on 
" r • 
one hand, purposely developed to seek for power and eleitoral support. On the 
other hand they are organizationally underdeveloped and generally lack the 
leadership, platform and popular support to be parties. For clarification, they 
can farther be distinguished as political participatory groups and political 
commentary groups, in which the former took an active part in elections, while 
the latter concentrated solely on voicing their opinion and views. 
Pressure groups, on the contrary, differs either from parties or political 
groups in two aspects under the context of Hong Kong. First, their concern is 
usually restricted to particular issue areas. Secondly, they attempt to influence 
the government through extra-institutional means rather than inclusion into the 
establishment. Obviously, the differences between them and political groups are 
ambiguous and sometimes the terms are used interchangeably. In reality, under 
the special political circumstances in Hong Kong, pressure groups were also 
highly politicized and performed much of the functions similar to the political 
groups during the past. In the following, for the sake of background information 
of the subject matter, merely a brief history of the above organizations will be 
offered2. 
19Ws 
First signs of pressure group polities emerged in the 1970，s. Hong Kong 
had then undergone significant socio-economic changes in the process of 
industrialization and urbanization. The society became more differentiated and 
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professionalized, the new local generation grew up, being more educated and 
demanding higher living standards. Local community identity also gradually 
emerged (Louie, 1991a). The 1966 and 67 not e indicated as "integration crisis" 
(King, 1981) between the compartmentalized bureaucratic polity and the mass 
(Lau, 1982). The traditional intermediate organizations had their functions in 
decline (Lau, 1980)* The originally secluded bureaucrats began to take up a 
more active role in welfare and service delivery, as well as strengthening the 
communiGation channels down to the grassroots (examples are the District 
Officer Scheme and Mutual Aid Committee movements). 
The reform was, however, limited in scope and the effect was 
unsatisfactory. The nature of the bureaucratic polity was largely undisturbed and 
the majority of population were still under-represented. On the contrary, as the 
role of government enlarged, conflict with the society arouse and even greater 
demand was induced. People unable to seek solutions began to politicize and 
channel their grievances through radical means. 
The first pressure groups were brought about by social workers and 
agencies subsidized by Western Churehes, notably examples were the Society 
for Community Organizations (SOCO) and Christian Industrial Committee 
(CIC). At the same time, student movements in the Universities, inspired by the 
Cultural Revolution in Mainland China, also started to nourish. Though many 
directed their focus on China, still some began to search for the role of societal 
critique. The social workers and the students together, gradually became the �� ‘ . 
representatives of the grass-root and actively articulated their needs. On one 
hand, waves of campaigns like protests and petitions around specific issues were 
launched, attracting media attention and public sympathy. On the other hand, 
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conscious-raising programs and local resident organizations were pulled up. 
In general, their activities were still small in scale, ad hoc based and 
suffering from the lack of organization and resources. However, with the 
colonial government as a common target, the originally sectoral groups shared 
similar orientations and mutual support (Lui, 1989a). In the late 1970，s, 
territorial wide campaign coalitions could be occasionally formed. At the same 
time, some new brands, stimulated by diversified events and focused on specific 
issues, were added onto the list, like the People's Council on Public Housing 
Policy (PGHP), Social Workers General Union (SWGU) and Professional 
Teachers' Union (PTU). 
1980's 
The 1997 issue was put onto the public agenda when Sino-British 
negotiation started in 1982. Hong Kong people were then mobilized in the 
battle of public opinion, while beginning to search for new roles in facing the 
situation. New groups aimed ； at voicing their views and opinions were 
established. Examples were Meeting Point (MP) and New Hong Kong Society 
(NHKS), consisting mainly of young university graduates with idealist outlooks. 
As the future of Hong Kong was seemingly determined and the promise of ‘ 
"Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong" was assured by Chinese officials, middle 
class elites as well as established , professionals were further mobilized. 
Representative groups were Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS) and Hong 
Kong People's Association (HKPA) (Leung,1986). The conservative public 
office holders had also joined the game by forming the Progressive Hong Kong 
Society. 
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At the same time, political reform was initiated by the colonial 
government, aiming at building a representative government "with its authority 
rooted in Hong Kong". Indirect elections in Legco were promised in 1985 and 
direct elections were hinted to take place in 1988. These moves further 
stimulated the political commentary groups to take a more active role in 
political participation, in order to "meet the challenge of the age". Many groups 
tried their attempt in the 1985 DB elections and obtained preliminary successes 
(Louie, 1991a). Although, in a word, these political participatory groups were 
then loosely organized, bounded in membership and lacked popular support, 
their backup to candidates were largely insignificant. 
Meanwhile, new forces known as "livelihood concern groups" also took 
active part in the elections3. Consisting of social workers, the concerns of these 
groups were largely local. They sometimes developed ties with the territorial 
groups which seek to plant their local bases (except MP which developed its 
own local branches). On the whole, all the organizers were still prominently 
middle class professionals. Mass involvements were minimal. 
Since the eve of 1985, a rapid decline was encountered. China showed 
great resistance to the political reform and began to intervene into local 
politics. The colonial political reform was virtually abandoned (Lau, 1987). The 
drafting process of the Basic Law indicated that the ultimate control of the 
future was in the hands of the Chinese Government. Claim for "convergence" 
became the rule* Middle class members responded sensitively and the 
emigration rate increased drastically. Political groups also retreated from their 
prior optimism and some even fade out of the arena, except those core 
members, who did well in the elections and expecting popular support, were 
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still keenly advocating the democratic virtues during the prolonged course of 
Basic Law debates (Cheng, 1989). In 1986，a new political group, Association 
for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), were organized by activists of 
several smaller groups, adopting a more grassroots image with strong local links. 
Together with MP arid HKAS, it form the core of the democratic movement. 
Although direct election to Legco in 1988 was eventually turned down, they still 
have significant improvements in the following DB and UC/RC electoral 
mobilizations. 
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Within the same period, the role of pressure groups became obscure, as 
compared to their militancy in the 1970，s, Due to the shift of general societal 
concern, pressure groups became the subordinate of the democratic movement. 
Some figures, notably Szeto Wah of PTU and Lau Chin-Shek of CIC, became 
liberal leaders. PTU and PCHP also took active roles in the 1985 and 1988 DB 
elections. The radical campaign activists seemed to give way towards more 
institutionalized means of interest articulation. DB member offices, with more 
information and better access to officials, replaced resident organizations to 
serve the local communities. The logic of electoral politics overshadowed the 
logic of social movement4. 
As activists shift to political groups and focused on constitutional affairs , . 
the resources of pressure groups contract. Voluntary agencies under government 
sponsorship began to apoliticize themselves. Foreign funding also decreased 
with the increasing affluence of Hong Kong (Wong, 1989). 
However, as long as the nature of governance remained unchanged and 
civil political forces were by and large excluded from the decision-making 
process, extra-institutional, conflictual means were still frequently employed by 
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both the political groups and pressure groups at all levels (Cheung and Louie, 
1991). Mass rallies emerged in events like Daya Bay incidence and the 
campaign for 1988 direct election. Gradual politicization of the population 
under the impact of 1997 and the plurality of civic groups and interest groups 
resulted from rapid socio-economic development also provides some breeding 
field for new forms of collective actions in the 1980's. 
1990，s 
Entering 1990's, Hong Kong approaches the late-transitional period. 
Influences/ of China gradually intensifies and the problem of ungovernability 
face� by the fading colonial government deepens (Lau, 1990b). Political parties 
become the new actors of the scenario, which can tentatively be correlated to 
three significant political changes. 
First, the tragic June-fourth incident in 1989 undeniably incurred great 
impact on the territory which is hard to be summarized in a few words. In short, 
the democratic movement in China established strong emotional links of Hong 
Kong People with their motherland and the compatriots, and intensely devoting 
their support. The liberals received a "godsend" (Cheng, 1989a) from which 
their public image and credibility greatly strengthened. Though first hesitate to 
take radical appeals and slow in response to the emerging events, they were 
able to organize three over-a-million rallies under the flag Alliance in Support 
of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (ASDMC). The urge for 
democracy of the local citizens were greatly aroused. Meanwhile, even the 
conservative businessmen agreed to accelerate the development of 
representative government. 
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However, as soon as the military crackdown occurred, people buried into 
despair and shock who began to query for the future. Loss of confidence and 
search for "political insurance" became the dominant scene. The severe verbal 
attacks from Chinese officials further deepened the conflicts and divided public 
opinion. It was under, such chaos which directly gave birth to the liberal party: 
United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK). No wonder its further development 
was also complicated by the June-Fourth factor. 
Second, the final accomplishment of the Basic Law in 1990，which laid 
down the future political path (Louie, 1991a), added farther momentum to 
party formation. The debate on "how the cake should be divided" ended and 
now came to its practice. Although the liberals showed greater dissatisfaction 
to the outcoming model but voices soon calmed down and all forces prepared 
their new part in the game. 
Third, at the same time, an agreement between Chinese and British 
Governments allowed eighteen direct elected seats to Legco in 1991，as well as 
guaranteeing continuity of constitutional arrangement before and after 1997. 
Though the direct elected seats still composed a minority in Legco, the change 
was still tremendous and soon attracted great attention of various groups. It was 
not surprising that various parties bloom in short period to meet the situation. 
The discussion on the establishment of UDHK started immediately after 
June-fourth incident, initiated by Mr. Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. In fact, 
negotiations among the "Big-three" for merger had then already proceeded for 
some time, which was ultimately turned down. Groups, especially MP, showed 
resistance to surrender their original identities. After prolonged bargaining and 
futuations, it was finally decided the new party would recruit individual 
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participants while MP and ADPL remained their own active role in political 
participation and dual membership was tolerated, UDHK^ MP and ADPL 
eventually became the new "Big-three"5. 
Though it is not the objective of the present study to detail the formation 
(as well as "unjoining") ofUDHK, but the impact on future inter-organizational 
relationship was apparent and worth some description. There were general signs 
of hindrance for the new party formation as soon as Chinese official press 
started to condemn the supporting activities for the so-called "anti-
revolutionaries", under which Szeto and Lee, being chairman and Vice-chairman 
of ASDMC, were isolated out by names. Some officials announced that future 
SAR leaders must be patriotic and supportive to the Basic Law, spearheading 
also towards them. 
In fact, the apparent overlapping of leadership between UDHK and 
ASDMC was always disturbing and caused suspicions on the new party. Though 
the leaders continue to emphasize organizational independence and uniqueness 
of the two and that UDHK would only be a local political party concentrating 
on Hong Kong internal affairs, such ambiguous words merely reflected the 
intensity of their role-conflicts. It was also evident that they soon after June-
fourth tried to cool down the activities of ASDMC and adopted low-profile in 
facing the political reality. They even hinted to accept the Chinese hardline 
leaders and resume dialogue with the Mainland officials6. But simultaneously 
their preservations of central positions in ASDMC showed their fear for the loss 
of mass support, thus inducing deep dilemmas on themselves. 
We cannot, however, draw a direct conclusion that such organizational 
burden inhibits further conglomeration of the liberals. MP had for long 
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displayed inclination to remain as autonomous. It was generally asserted that 
ideological coherence was the major consideration, and that members' integrity 
and commitment to the cause had gained its own momentum, especially under 
the claim of "democratic reversionist" as opposed to the "democratic counter-
However, such "historical" and "ideological" reasonings are far from 
satisfactory. First, MP was also and until now a member of ASDMC and even 
proclaimed that it has the Tesponsibility to promote China affairs. It endorsed 
a less confrontational strategy but was still highly critical towards the present 
power-holders of China. Second, concerning the internal affairs of Hong Kong, 
MP chose a more compromising and flexible relationship with Chinese officials, 
while it is in fact also the official policy of UDHK though which seems to be 
plagued by its internal variations and inconsistencies. There was ultimately, no 
fundamental disagreement but only strategic variations. 
Third, as revealed in a recent study (Shum，1991), the "ideological purity" 
of MP had already gone a far way since its establishment. In order to obtain 
organizational expansion and popular support, the positions of MP was 
continuously adjusting and its dominant elites shifting. After 1989，the first 
generation "ideologues" had virtually faded out the group (p.29). 
" I 
In reality, it was then the "pragmatists" who dominated MP and insisted 
on the maintenance of MP, as differentiated from UDHK. They openly 
promoted a "pluralistic approach" of participation and diversification of 
resources to "multiple means of influences". Conclusively, in the analysis of the 
official MP "Declaration in 1990，s", Shum (1991) found that, 
"...the group's original aim to，return to China，was 
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never abandoned but the real aim was shifting to 
ensure the survival of the group by contrast to the 
other groups with similar outline…As explained by 
the present Vice-chairman, it was a political reality 
for local political groups to touch with China." 
(pp.31-32) 
If the consideration of MP was apparent, that of ADPL was far more 
fluidic and uncertain. Throughout UDHK formation, ADPL did not show the 
resistance as MP and there was general reports on the possible dissolution of 
itself to merge into UDHK. ADPL chairman Fung Kin-Kei even became one 
of the twelve core members in the organizing committee of UDHK. 
Circumstances rapidly altered as Fung suddenly withdrew from the committee 
in November, 1989，which induced much criticism of other members. The 
official explanation maintained that the split was due to distances of class 
positions and views on social policies. ADPL insisted itself as a representative 
of lower class interest. It is difficult to verify whether this was the ultimate 
concern of Fung and ADPL. But later evidence showed that the demarcation 
on policy positions between it and UDHK were unexpectedly little, nor did 
ADPL inclined to employ more, radical means in opposing the government. 
It is, however, through informal channel, that the strategic concern of 
ADPL was revealed. Wong Fu-wing, a core member of ADPL, expressed his 
views on party development in a long article, 
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"...If we farther realize the confidence crisis is 
actually an expression of communist phobia, and 
the HK-China conflict is not yet moderated, the 
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"liberal party" established under this background 
will easily be misinterpreted as a "counter-
communist united front". Though it is not our 
motives, but the objective effects still have to be 
evaluated carefully. Furthermore, if the "party" is 
unfortunately labelled by/china as enemy, it is not 
difficult to imagine the future status of the party, 
its organizers and members on Hong Kong 
affairs..,."7 
A note on case selection 
Up to this point, we have overall images of political organizations up to 
the eve of UDHK formation, with MP and ADPL as the focal concern of the 
presented study being highlighted . Undoubtedly, both have exhibited great 
similarities. First, both chose to remain as minority groups when compared to 
the newly formed UDHK, and both had consequently shown ambitions to 
transform into parties. Second, both seemed to adopt a relative "middle-lower 
class" platform (as least self-proclaimed) and a conciliatory attitude toward 
China, in return being more acceptable by Chinese Government among the 
liberals. Both seek to survive in the leaks of the compressed political space. 
On the other hand, they also displayed great dissimilarities. As history 
tells, differences were expressed in their organizational characteristics. MP 
demonstrated a centralized, cohesive group core while ADPL being a mixture 
of former smaller groups, representing the penetration (top-down) and diffusion 
(bottom-up) models of organizational construction contrarily (Panebianco, 1988， 
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p.50). Consequently, MP was dominated by non-public office holders and ADPL 
was the opposite. Further-more, their relationship with the pressure groups also 
contrasted each other. ADPL, fundamentally based on locally situated grassroot 
organizations and pressure groups, retaining strong ties with these organizations. 
MP, however, initiated by intellectuals, extending their influences to the 
grassroots only through setting up local branches. Its connections with pressure 
groups were more limited to middle class ones. Most important of all, as further 
development revealed, their relationship with the newly formed UDHK varied. 
Out of general expectation, ADPL eventually run into deep conflicts with 
UDHK, while MP remains a close colleague of the latter till now. Their results 
in the 1991 Legco election and the role in the rearranged Legco also varied. 
It will be the objective of this study to compare the two organizations, 
exploring the nature and trend of their relationships with other parties, notably 
UDHK and illustrates their different strategic choices and adaptive modes 
facing environmental constraints and other political actors. Through such 
comparison, it is hoped that the opportunities and limitations of liberal political 
organizations, both as individual or in general as well as their possibilities of 
future development can be more thoroughly revealed. 
Returriing to the general picture of the 1990's, party formation become 
the dominant mode of political organizational development. Primarily, public 
hostility towards parties has altered (Louie, 1991a) and Chinese officials have 
gradually moderated their suspicion on party formation. In response to the 
establishment of UDHK, other forces also kept up their steps. Notable 
examples are the business interest representing Liberal Democratic Federation 
(LDF) and the pro-China Hong Kong Citizen Forum (HKCF). Together with 
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MP and ADPL after reoriented themselves in the new situation, they added up 
to the flourishing scenario of 1991 elections. 
For convenience, it is legitimate to categorize all these organizations as 
political parties (or quasi-parties), to contrast with the political groups in the 
1980's, for at least all of them have clearly shown intentions to evolve into 
genuine parties and continuously been strengthening their organization and 
discipline, as well as seeking for a more active role in campaign activities and 
candidate selections. In short, they resemble some sort of "cadre parties" (Lau, 
1992) which are small organizations of activists who concentrate on 
electioneering activities. However, it should be reminded that their internal 
variations are great and levels of development differ. On the whole, parties of 
the liberals are more developed and their mobilization strengths were fully 
exposed in elections. They, either have a longer history starting from early 
1980，s，or with leaders who can even trace their history of political activism 
back to the 1970's (Louie, 1991a). 
Therefore, it should also be remarked that most of the time generation 
of new liberal organizations only imply a recomposition and reorientation of the 
existing elites (Lui, 1989). The constitution of the liberals, as mentioned, not 
only stabilized since 1986, but many of them also shared common experiences 
in the 1970's under the impact of student movement and opposition with the 
colonial government. In short, while figures are unchanged, the nature and form 
of their organizations, as well as the socio-political context they operate, have 
already gone through substantive changes. 
On the contrary, pressure groups in 1990's also face new developments. 
Many have retreated from their political roles in 1980，s and searched for their 
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new positions in the late-transitional period. Some tend to be silent or remain 
independent in elections and keep distances from public office holders, e.g. 
PCHP and SWGU. They also turn to strengthen their organizations and 
sharpen their influences as representatives of sectoral interests and spokesmen 
on particular issues, e^ g. the formation of the Confederation of Trade-Unions 
(CTU) as well as the preparation for the formation of General Teaching 
Council. 
Moreover, the employment of mass protests and rallies also grow 
significant after 1989 and they become more "conventionally" adopted by the 
population. Their prominence is also due to the worsening economic situation 
and the surfacing of class conflict (Lau,1990b), notably during debates like 
central provident fund and the importation of labor. Socio-economic issues 
once again become the public focal concern and the unique role of pressure 
groups in articulating the views of the grassroot gradually regains its 
momentum. Besides, new branches of movement, e.g. environmental and 
woman's groups, also attract increasing attentions. In general, however, the 
organizational weaknesses including lack of mass support still carried on and 
the over-dependency on political party leadership is also likely to hinder their 
further growth. ‘ 
Some generalizations 
Foregoing is a historical description of the political organizations from 
1970's to 1990's. In the following, they are further re-categorized into some 
analytical schemes, in order to display a more general picture8. Figure 1 
attempts to offer a simplified imagery of the evolvement of the multi-
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organizational field from 1970's to 1990's, which indicates the gradual 
consolidation and crystallization of the liberal political forces, as well as the 
growing demarcation between political groups or parties and pressure groups. 
More concretely, various political organizations can further be classified as 
follows. Basically three dimensions are employed: first, organizational purpose 
(institutional/extra- institutional�influences? commentary and lobbying/direct 
participation? cause/interest articulation?); second, level of concern 
(local/territorial affairs? general societal/specific sectoral issues?); third, degree 
of organization (formal/informal? institutionalized/non-institutionalized?). 
Figure 2 summarizes all types (I to VI as indicated) of political organizations 
in Hong Kong, while figure 3 and 4 focus on Type I organizations (parties and 
political groups) and Type III organizations (pressure groups) respectively9. 
From the figures, several special features can be discovered. First, 
besides differences in nature and shape, the sequence of organizational 
development are also revealed, e.g. in Figure 2, Type II organizations first 
appeared in 1970，s, which gave birth to Type IV organizations and eventually 
came Type III and Type I organizations, with parties not appearing until 1990，s. 
However, all types of organizations still exist in some form till the date, 
although their political relevance vary greatly. Second, their constitution of 
membership can also be interpreted, e.g. in Figure 2，liberal political 
organizations of Type I and III are predominantly middle class background, 
while Type II and IV are likely to have large portion of lower class activists. 
Distinctively, in Figure 3，"think tanks" are a kind of upper class business and 
industrial based organizations not available to liberals, e.g. Hong Kong 
Foundation. Third, while all Type I organizations take care of general societal 
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affairs, some Type II organizations convergently possess relatively broad 
' % . I 
• • § 
concerns (Figure 2) which may partially be explained by the special political 
^^ H^ I] 
circumstances in Hong Kong. However, the margin is largely unclear and may 
,1 I 
differ in various historical stages. 
Ultimately, the； scope of concern of the present study are also specified. 
In this and the next chapter, general environmental constraints encountered by 
liberal political organizations (or even non liberal ones) as a whole will be 
discused. In Chapter VI, MP and ADPL, which fall into the category “ parties" 
(or quasi-parties) after 1990，s，are delimited as focus. A closer examination on •. • 
their interrelationships with other liberal parties, especially UDHK, with 
... 
reference to the power dynamics and context-specific interactions among them, 
will be attempted. The same logic, of course, can also be applicable on the 
other political organizations, which, however, cannot be detailed here. Overall 
speaking, furthermore, the study will copncentrate on territotial level while 
locally based groups will basically be excluded. 
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Figure 2. Political Organizations in Hong Kong 
Level of Concern 
Territorial Local 
Institutional Parties Livelihood 




Extra-Institutional Pressure Groups Residents 
Trade Unions (II) Organizations (IV) 
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Figure 3. Type I Organizations 
Degree of Organization 
Formal Informal 




Commentary and Think Political Commentary 
Lobbying Tanks Groups 
Note: Level of concern of all are general societal affairs. 
Figure 4. Type II Organizations 
Level of Concern 
General Specific 
Interest Housing Groups Professional 
Trade Unions Trade Unions 
Organizational 
Purpose 
Cause • Student Groups Environmental 
Church-related Groups Groups 
Women's Groups 
Note: Degree of organization of all are non-institutionalized probably except 
PTU： 
A further note on research design: 
Unit of analysis 
Why, then, does this study focus on particular groups rather than the 
organizational-set as a whole? It is because inter-organizational relationships 
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arft fundamentally viewed as active choices and coping strategies of autonomous 
. , v . . ,.. . . . . . . . . , ' ; ., 
actors in facing the environmental constraints. While actions as well as reactions 
of other major actors are equally emphasized, they are however, understood 
with reference to the two central cases selected. 
Why, however, does this study not pinpoint to strategic elites then? First, 
it will be beyond out attention to explain intra-group interactions. Second, as 
the "organization" factor is becoming significant in Hong Kong politics, their 
existence as unique social entities is well justified and undoubtedly individual 
actors tend to be increasingly constrained by the organizational settings. Third, 
what is more fundamental is to clarify the role of elites in political 
organizations. Organizational decisions are undoubtedly directly affected by 
their judgements and calculations. It is, of course, not assuming that 
organizations are monolithic wholes but at the same time, it is reasonable to 
suppose a dominant coalition (Panebianco, 1988, p.37) existing in every 
organizations, which is responsible for making decisions and adapting to both 




The study is fixed as a cross-sectional, structural analysis, exploring the 
interrelationship of liberal political organizations beyond the official 
endorsement of the Basic Law as well as the establishment of UDHK in April, 
1990, which were two, though unequally weighted symbols of the opening of the 
late-transitional period. Minor variations caused by time after that will be 
ignored and this will probably be one of the limitations of the present study. 
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2. Amorphous mass and amateur politicians: socio-cultural factor10 
‘v - • • • :, ’ . . . .... . ..,: . . • .. , , 
Forgoing is a factual, historical description of political 
organizations. In the following, two more general explanatory efforts are 
attempted to explore the broad socio-political context underlying their 
developments. As we can see, they are both contrary as well as complementary 
to each other. While one focuses on the political institution in the next chapter, 
the other focuses on socio-cultural factor as explained below. Though political 
organizations have undergone tremendous transformation during the past 
twenty years, the social environment they situate, in general, is far from being 
favorable. 
Amorphous Mass 
The political culture of Hong Kong has been extensively dealt with by 
Professor Lau Siu-kai and his colleagues in the past (Lau, 1982, Lau and Kuan, 
1986a and 1988，Lau and Kuan and Wan 1991). The Chinese community is 
fundamentally composed of self-selected immigrants and their off-springs, 
characterized by a kind of refugee mentality. Community identification is weak 
and the people in general are inward-looking and self-seeking, burying their 
heads in narrow parochial, material interests. Social relationships are 
predominantly utilitarian and instrumental, which could have little exception in 
politics. The sense of political powerlessness and alienation is particularly strong 
and participation in public affairs is continuously low. Though the 1997 issues 
had generated a moderate politicizing effects, the weakening of social fabric 
under the confidence crisis can only be followed by intensified fatalism and 
frustrations (Lau, 1990b). 
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Such political culture is, systematically, embodied in a more or less 
congruent social structure. Although government intervention has been growing 
gradually after 1970's, the separation of the polity and society is well-sustained 
under the economic laissez-faire policy. Correspondingly, even if expectations 
on government is generally increased and unconventional political means 
gradually being adopted, people have never challenge the "sacred orthodox" of 
"stability and prosperity". No demand for radical social reform has ever been 
raised (Lau and Kuan, 1986b). 
The society under the self-restricted administration is essentially loosely 
organized, composed of vast isolated familial groups, which constitute self-help 
resource networks to meet the basic needs of the population and contribute to 
the endurance of political stability11. Though there was also a multitude of 
socio-economic organizations followed by rapid social changes and economic 
development, they are by and large atomized and differentiated. They, including 
class based ones, are unable to grasp general support and cultivate common 
identities (Lau, 1990a). The elite-mass gap is particularly apparent. Their 
capacities to form the basis of collective actions are limited. 
The apolitical society, as a whole, is further secured in its larger 
economic and political environment. The well-performed economy has for long 
provided general life satisfactions and upward mobility channels, diverting 
people from the far more risky political careers. The efficient and rational 
colonial administration is characterized by its "benign autocracy" (Lau, 1988). 
Though lack of legitimate base, it is tolerantly and pragmatically accepted by 
its citizens, especially when there is virtually no choice, for the only alternative 
is communist rule. The unavoidable intrusion of China factor approaching 1997 
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has basically altered the political scenario. However, the dilemmas and 
uncertainties of political reality inhibits further emergence of coherent and 
pervasive ideological programs. Demands for democracy and autonomy of 
future SAR is equally adhesive and divisive. No apparent issues are ready for 
extensive mass mobilization especially when the capitalist status quo is already 
deeply rooted and the possibility of independence is ruled out (Lau, 1987). 
All these directly added up to a general picture. The apathetic and short-
sighted mass, together with the loosely organized social structure, form an 
extremely poor basis for the flourish of political leadership. As Lau states it • . . . • ... — 
clearly, 
"[The democratic leaders] have attained only 
meagre success in organizing the mass and 
involving them in sustained political actions. The 
unifying and disciplinary functions that can be 
performed by strong mass-based organizations are 
thus denied the democratic leaders. On the 
contrary, the need to appeal to amorphous and 
volatile masses intensifies the conflict among 
democratic leaders in their individual attempts to 
anticipate, shape, lead or not to lag behind erratic 
changes in mass attitudes and behaviour." (1990a, 
p.36) 
The "volatility" of mass sentiments is partially a product of uncertainty 
and suspicion about the future. With the originally weak community identity 
further undermined by the sense of inefficacy facing 1997, the actions of 
. 37 . 
political leaders in adjusting to the fluidic and confused mass demands can 
easily be accused as opportunism and pursuit of self-interests. The feelings of 
distrust and insecurity are common (Lau, 1990a, p.30). The status quo 
orientation and lack of fundamental ideological issues further blurs the ability 
of the mass to differentiate among various types of leaders, inducing the leaders 
to exaggerate their minor differences through more radical and emotional 
appeals. In short, mass sentiments are not only unsupportive, but also further 
shaken the solidarity among political leaders and their capabilities of 
organization formation. 
Although party formation becomes the dominant trend and the political 
roles of parties drastically raised in the 1990's, Lau has demonstrated the public 
ambivalence towards parties in a recent study (1992). Though public acceptance 
of parties increases, they are expected to play no more than a secondary and 
oppositional role under the new political order. They seem to serve as the 
expressive agent of common discontent and frustrations, especially carrying anti-
China sentiments, though the continuity of such sentiments is questionable 
under popular political realism. Parties are, for the mean time, far from being 
viewed as a possible alternative of the present administration. The support they 
receive is, paradoxically, built upon their harmony with and dependency on the 
existing political institutions. 
Disorganized middle class 
Besides viewing the public in a general, undifferential manner, an 
alternative is to narrow down the focus on more concrete, specific structural 
terms, namely, the class approach (Wong and Liu, 1992，So, 1990). Since 
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political leaders mainly come from middle class background, it is worthwhile to 
explore the middle class make-up in Hong Kong to evaluate the structural 
support they receive12. 
Although middle class activists proliferate, this does not logically imply 
middle class activism11，In fact there is a general distance between the activists, 
which are small cohorts with common social movement background, and the 
middle class members as a whole. The latter, though many also possess general 
aspirations for democracy acquired from Westernized education, their support 
can only be offered based on genuine interests (Lau, 1987). In reality, they are 
both the product and beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth since 1970，s 
and their interests are well-preserved under the status-quo. Most of them 
experience upward mobility and improved living standards, which reinforce their 
support for equality of opportunity and meritocracy, thus further distant 
themselves from the lower class. 
Moreover, their formation, due to wide arrays of available mobility 
channels and socio-economic differentiation, is heterogeneous in nature and 
possess no common identities (Lui,199Q) probably except similar consumption 
pattern. Upward mobility farther promotes interpersonal competition. Therefore 
they are, in line with the general public, materialistic, utilitarian and privatistic, 
‘ 
ideologically diffused (Lau, 1987，1990a). Such lack of solidarity is also directly 
reflected into the organizations of their activists. Since mobility barrier is 
minimal and the capitalists serve their interest well, the middle class is also 
dependent and uncritical in nature. Class cooperation rather than class conflict 
is enhanced. Such conservatism is even embedded in the moderate reformist 
orientations of the political leaders. 
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It is therefore not surprising to find emigration being most widely 
adopted by the middle class as a response to the 1997 issue. Though many stay 
or return after emigrated, their concern is the opportunity for economic 
achievement rather than commitment to their home territory. The opening of 
political channels partially enhances their participation potentials, but as vested 
interests of the existing system, their demand on government for service and 
welfare is small and daily living problems can be solved efficiently through 
private means (Wong and Lui, 1992). Neither passive fear nor discontent facing 
1997 could drive them into cohesive class action. In short, the most efficient 
means to cope with uncertainty in the future is retreat (Lui, 1987). 
The poverty of the middle class in encountering the political situation is 
also reflected in the lack of direction and shallow ideological content of the 
political leaders. Without foresight and holistic vision of what future should be, 
they can merely react contingently to the superimposed political agenda, thus 
likely to result in short-term interest calculations and shifting coalescing 
behaviour. 
Amateur Politician 
Further narrowing down the focus, what can be said in addition on the 
specific mentality of the political leaders in Hong Kong14? What continuities 
and discontinuities can be found between them and the public spirit? Professor 
Lau Siu-kai employs the term "amateur politicians" to characterize them, for 
which he draws insights from two scholars (c.f. Lau, 1990a, pp.34-35), 
"The primary rewards of politics to the amateur is 
the sense of having satisfied a felt obligation to 
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，participate，，and this satisfaction is greater the 
higher the value can attach to the ends which the 
outcomes of politics serve." (Wilson, 1966) 
"In competitive societies, the investing, calculating, 
transacting, risk-taking quality of politics may 
attract individualistic, entrepreneurial types of 
personalities who bring to politics the ethics and 
practices of laissez-faire capitalism - with crucial 
implications for policy-making and political 
leadership." (Burns, 1978) 
At the first glance, the two accounts seems to contradict, for one 
emphasizes on idealistic, political ends while the other on instrumental, political 
means for self interests, one on normative the other on strategic orientation. 
But as Lau elaborates (1990a, p.34), 
"It is difficult to determine to what extent the 
political leaders of Hong Kong really believe in 
public services as the cardinal value that guide 
their behaviour... In fact, a desire for public service 
and the pursuit of self-advancement can coexist 
comfortably. More importantly, even as amateur 
politician is prone to be elitist and individualistic 
(emphasis added)." 
Several points are attempted to be further elaborated here. First, the 
conception of "public service" or "public interest" is actually extremely vague and 
lack of substantive content. It is subject to shifts in meaning according to the 
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specific context of the speller as well as his interpretation. Comparatively, the 
American amateur Democrats characterized by Wilson still exhibit more or less 
coherent worldviews, "The source of the expectations which account for the 
behaviour of the amateur seem to be found in a，political ethic，[:]…the desire • 
to moralize public life, the effort to rationalize power with law, and insistence 
that correct goals will be served only if goals are set and officials selected by 
correct procedures." (1966, p.8-9) However, those in Hong Kong are far more 
abstract and confusing. As Lau remarked recently, "What is most extra-ordinary 
is that almost all of the political groups claim to represent the people in Hong 
Kong as a whole" (1992, p.l) In reality, such conceptions of Hong Kong 
politicians simply )reflect their hallows in ideological content and inability in 
consolidating their mass base. 
Second, the inducement for political participation through political ideals 
and moral fervor rather than real interest and power is extremely vulnerable. 
Also Wilson notes, "The amateur must constantly find ideals, personalities and 
causes sufficiently to replenish the easily exhausted reservoir of enthusiasm 
which stimulates him." (p.226) Evidently, most amateurs have major incomes 
other than politics and can always fall back on his main occupation (Lau, 1990， 
p.35). As a result, the commitment of amateurs is highly unstable and turnover 
problem is unavoidably serious. Furthermore, emphasis on ideals easily induce 
cleavages. An amateur tend to insist on his own judgements "rather than 
submerging himself easily in group consensus." (ibid.) "When an amateur club 
splits into factions, the issues at stake quickly become infused with ideology." 
(Wilson, 1966, p. 10) Therefore, organizational solidarity of amateurs is also 
highly problematic. Shum's case study on MP resembles this (1991), the militant 
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"ideologues" tend to contribute verbally rather than beaning substantial 
responsibilities of the group and hope to be "free-riders". Moreover, they used 
to criticize others idealistically without considering objective circumstances. 
Eventually, they can do nothing but fade out of the group. 
Third, and consequently, amateurs either drop out of the political scene 
or evolve into professionals who become ambitious and power-seeking in 
essence. More strikingly, however, the amateur spirit continues. As Wilson also 
notes, " The need to maintain these clubs is the principal constraints that moves 
amateur leaders, whatever their private motives, to protect their，amateur 
standing，carefully. Whether the leaders are amateurs or not, they must act as 
if thevare in order to take advantage of the resources which the clubs can offer 
(emphasis added)," (1966，p.5-6) Therefore, the root of amateurs is 
fundamentally "found in the expectations of the followers, not in the motives of 
the leaders."(ibid.) The apathetic and alienated mass as well as the 
deideological political environment in Hong Kong is ultimately responsible for 
shaping the mentality of amateurs. 
Base on these, we can safely construct a full picture of the amateur 
politicians. Due to their relative freedom from mass constraints and given the 
"vagueness" and unspecification of "public service", the amateurs can, like * �� . . . -
investing and transacting, manipulate their definition of "public interest" in 
order to adjust to the fluidic and paradoxical environment. Those who maladjust 
are doomed to be defeated. They soon find disillusionments or frustrations in 
realpolitik and dropped out of the arena. Complimentarily, the opportunistic 
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and instrumental orientations, which tend to persist, will attempt to be disguised 
by the appeals to ideals, principles and fundamentally, public interest in front 
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of the fliiidic, indeterminate mass15. 
Liberals have never escaped from this logic. Their marginal positions 
within the establishments further enables and facilitates them to demonstrate 
their commitment to the cause simply through opposition, reacting disjunctively 
issue by issue, without the need to clarify what they precisely believe and 
uphold. The support they receive through the role of critique, in return, are also 
far from coherent. Distrust and alienation of the mass has never been remedied 
by their efforts. The poverty of leadership, on one hand, and the amorphous 
mass base, on the other hand, ultimately forms a vicious circle which could 
hardly be overcome. 
It is not the purpose of the above discussion to discredit the political 
ideals or challenge the motives of amateurs in political participation. 
Nonetheless, one must realize that the overwhelmingly idealistic and ethical 
approach to politics is intrinsically disembodied and dislocated. It is a kind of 
"verbal" or "talking" politics which is however "words without deeds". It 
resembles consumer behaviour which is basically individualistic and rationalistic, 
which only takes up fragments of life rather than demanding complete 
devotions. It also seem to assimilate the character of "intellectuals", who work 
in the ivory tower with abstract symbols and jargons rather than involve in solid, 
life and death struggles in social reality16. 
One step further, can we say anything about the underlying motivations 
of amateurs in general? Though such questions have no ultimate answers, some 
considerations can still more or less be prompted. First of all, the peculiar 
socio-political context of Hong Kong has undoubtedly formed a basic 
inducement. Freedom to voice opposition and lack of repression greatly reduces 
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the risk and cost of political participation. Political reform generated from 
above further provides direct and illusory wide open channels. As Shum quotes 
a political leader for "why he become active in politics is that a historical 
opportunity has been created, the middle class intellectual found they could 
affect the future development of Hong Korig and China without great sacrifices 
and paying high costs." (1991，p.37) Contrarily, the objective demand for 
participation, whether based on socio-economic interests or grievances, as 
revealed among either the general public or solely the middle class, is 
comparatively low. In brief, the mode of amateur activism can be characterized 
as "cost-push" rather thm "demand-pull" oriented, the calculative and utilitarian 
nature built-in is strongly exposed17. 
Second, the vulnerability of ideals and principles as sole inducement is 
likely to be supplemented by other incentives. This is particularly true in Hong 
Kong which the rationality and realism entailed from capitalist mode of 
decision making seemingly tend to overshallow expressions of "heroism" and 
"emotivity" (Leung, 1986). The attractions of politics is just，another business' 
(Ng, 1990). As one activist reflects, "The younger generation of Hong Kong 
have never had a chance to show their talents and realize their ambitions. It is 
completely comprehensible that they are so eager to try." (c.f. Leung, 1986， 
p.63) Besides the personal gratification derived from participation, other 
incentives may include solidarity, prestige, sociability and contact with 
celebrities (Wilson, 1973), as well as merely an escape from the boredom and 
routine of everyday private life (Hirschman, 1982) . The ultimate commonality 
is, however, that politics is predominantly activities in leisure time and is always 
subordinated to the main career. 
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Third, one of the most valuable inducement, as indicated earlier, is the 
experiences of success in commanding public support through elections and 
mass mobilization. Lots of leaders remain in the game are either public office 
holders or well-known figures within the community. Though far from asserting 
they must be power-seekers, it is reasonable to assume similarities among the 
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two types of personalities. For them, political techniques and strategic 
considerations probably play a dominant role. Like the "actionists" in the 
account of Shum (1991), they, devote their efforts in elections and contact with 
the mass, less concern with both ideological debates and organization work. 
They, with their abilities to overcome environmental barriers and promote 
organizational goal achievements, logically become the dominated strata central 
to political groups and parties. 
However, the sudden opening of the political system and the illusion of 
an easy assessable "power vacuum" as well as "the sense of urgency and short-
sighted political time horizon" under the time constraint approaching 1997 
(Lau, 1990a) produces mulplicity of similar sort of aspirants who rush into the 
political game aggressively and impatiently, inducing throat-cutting competition 
among them. Furthermore, the concentration in the grasping of virtually limited 
positions becomes their unique concern and the relatively demanding, long-term 
organization and mobilization tasks are consequently been neglected (Lau and 
Kuan, 1986b). 
On a whole, true amateurs are likely to be replaced easily by 
professionals, who may still possess the，amateur outlook，. Though the attempts 
to promote ideals and principles is still anticipated, they are by and large 
enclosed with the following character: individualistic and elitist, calculative and 
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opportunistic, pragmatic and utilitarian, which comfortably resemble that of the 
capitalist entrepreneur. Such mentality backed up by the poor mass support and 
ideological base, tend to induce conflict and competition, rather than brings 
cooperation and solidarity among the political leaders. 
To further conclude, the fourfold typology of political actors offered by 
Tilly (1987, p.88) is worth mentioned18: Zealots extremely highly value some 
collective goods that they will even sacrifice for it. Misers highly value their own 
existing resources that hardly any further actions will be taken. Run of the mills 
aim at a limited set of rewards, but only as long as the benefit excesses the cost. 
Opportunists seek to maximize their returns regardless of their nature. 
It is sufficiently reasonable to assert that no zealots can be found in 
Hong Kong19. On the one hand, much political problems can be channelled 
through private means. On the other, the dim prospect of a political career can 
always be substituted by a economic one. In the extreme, the middle class 
activists have no barrier to emigrate. To use the words of Hirschman (1970), 
the wide open，exit, opportunities (private means) greatly undermine the need 
and support for the Voice，options (public means)20. 
Established elites can partially be considered as misers under the 
patronage of upper governments. However, their lack of constitutional power 
as well as their internal fragmentation and competitions made them not able 
to sit back comfortably and remain inactive at all. All in all, the Hong Kong 
politicians, regardless of the socio-economic backgrounds, can at least be 
considered as run of the mills, if not totally opportunists. The variance will 
depend on the degree of substantiality about the 'principle's and，ideals，they 
uphold, which though seems not to be great at all. 
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III. Rule of the game: political change in late transitional Hong Kong 
1. Possibilities and constraints under the Basic Law: politico-institutional 
factors 
Basically, the socio-cultural approach and the politico-institutional 
approach is complementary with each other. While the former is society 
oriented, emphasizing the political consequences of socio-economic factors, the 
latter focuses on state structure and political factors. While one focuses on 
normative and cultural sphere, the other on structural and institutional context. 
Besides the contrast in theoretical orientations, they can also be 
supplementary to each other. First, while the socio-cultural factor provides a 
general, holistic picture of the macro political atmosphere, the politico-
institutional factor further specifies the concrete, behavioral context of political 
organizations. Structural locations and opportunity structures of various 
organizations are refined. While the former account seems to be relatively 
rough and vague, the latter would probably be more acute and substantiated1. 
While one may be said to be a birdeye，s view of a large jungle, another may be 
a closer examination of a small forest, if not the details of any particular tree. 
Second, the socio-cultural factor is likely to be reshaped under the rapidly 
changing political circumstances. Though far from being fluidic and easily 
modifiable, essentially it is neither constitutionally，fixed，nor secluded from its 
structural context. As Lau and Kuan (1986) observe, "It is common 
understanding in social science that value change normally lags behind 
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behavioral change. But the reverse apparently is true in Hong Kong." Logically, 
the explanatory power of socio-cultural factor is in doubt for, on one hand, it 
may not be in congruent with overt behavior. On the other hand, in order to 
grasp any emergent political phenomenon, only past and maybe outdated socio-
cultural traits can be based on, if we are not to be satisfied with a post hoc 
explanation of cultural shifts. Therefore, its applicability in account for political 
change is greatly limited. Conclusively, the understanding of value and normative 
orientation should avoid an oversocialized conception of man which assumes an 
ovewhelming and enduring belief system and should not be detached from its 
structural environment for which it is embedded in (Granovetter, 1985). 
On the contrary, the politico-institutional factor is also limited by its over-
emphasis on external constraints and structural coercive forces (Gambetta, 
1988). Actors are reduced to puppets of their institutional locations, neglected 
the internal predispositions and beliefs that guide their actions from within. The 
socio-cultural factor, therefore, is also a prerequisite for a more genuine 
understanding of institutional behavior. 
After clarifying theoretical issues rather simply, in the following, the 
institutional setting under political change in Hong Koiig is revealed2. Basically, 
the decolonization and political reform process is a top-down implementation 
process. As Professor Lau Siu-Kai states early (1985), 
"In the process of planned political change, the 
spontaneous actions of political activists in Hong 
Kong will play only a secondary role no matter how 
vociferous are their demand for influence. As the 
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opportunities and channels of political participation 
ar structured and provided by the Sino-British ruling 
elites, it is then not much of an exaggeration to say 
that the nature and composition of the emerging 
political elite in Hong Kong will be shaped by the 
provisions of the ruling elites in a series of reform 
measures." (p.2) 
Though, as history tells, the pro-active role of the British in the early 
stage soon retreated, the burden of constitutional reform was ultimately handed 
over to China, the future sovereign of Hong Kong coming closer over time. As 
Lau states later (1988), 
"China started off an arch-opponent to the reforms 
introduced by the colonial government, but she 
seemingly will end up not only accepting these 
reforms as the basis for the design of the future 
political system of Hong Kong. What is ironical is 
that the additional reforms to be embodied in the 
future system will move it in the same direction of 
change as previous colonial reforms" (p. 11) 
The resulted political system is finally written onto the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), which was officially adopted 
by the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1990. In short, it represents the 
final blueprint laid out by China to realize "one country two system" and "Hong 
Kong people rule Hong Kong", as well as determining how much power is 
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delegated and how power is allocated in the future. Consequently, it establishes 
the opportunities and channels for political mobility and leadership formation, 
but at the same time, it also sets the rules and arena of the game which bounds 
the activities and development of political organizations and leaders . 
Fundamentally, the system is characterized by it soft authoritarianism 
which strikingly resembles the present one, but it also permits delegation of 
power fragments to a wide range of groups, as a result of the 1997 issue and 
political reform (Lau, 1988). On the whole, "the new system is not conducive to 
the rise of strong popular leaders with solidaristic ties to one another." (Lau, 
1990a, p.13) In summary, it can be characterized by three basic features: its 
semi-dependency, the limited and fragmented power components and limited 
socio-economic role of government. 
Semi-dependency 
The political status of Hong Kong as a territory is either subordinated to 
Britain before 1997 or to China after that. The impossibility of independence 
means source of power and ultimate control is in the hands of higher 
governments. During the political transition and the transfer of sovereignty 
approaching, formal political power is gradually transferred from Britain to 
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China, which in turn determines its further allocation through the Basic Law. 
"The image of power vacuum created by the scheduled termination of colonial 
rule is illusory." (ibid.) 
Basic Law, as a direct reflection of such relationship, sets boundaries on 
the "high degree of self-government" to Hong Kong. First, the autonomy 
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assumed by the future SAR is no more than delegated power (Article 2 and 20, 
Basic Law) and the issue of residual power is subsequently veto by China (Kuan, 
1991). With no exception, the power to amend the Basic Law as initiated by the 
SAR is also highly restricted. 
Second, the autonomy concerning areas of self-government is also limited. 
As examples, with respect to the legislature, the Standing Committee of NPC is 
empowered to invalidate any law of the SAR deviated from the Basic Law 
(Article 17). Furthermore, national laws can be promulgated directly by the NPC 
(Annex III) to the SAR after consulting the Basic Law Committee. Under "the 
state of emergency", the central government can even "issue an order applying 
relevant national laws in the Region." (Article 18) 
Respecting the judiciary, its power of final adjudication is also limited 
under Article 19, which excludes jurisdiction over "acts of the state" such as 
defence and foreign affairs. Its power on the interpretation of the Basic Law is 
also limited "within the limits of the autonomy of the Region." (Article 158)4 
For the Executive authorities, although the Chief Executive is selected by 
election (Annex I), he or she, as well as principal officials of the government, 
still have to be appointed by the central government (Article 45，48). Chinese 
officials had repeatedly emphasized that the appointment is "substantial" rather 
than "formal". Moreover, besides being accountable to the SAR, the Chief 
Executive also has to be accountable to the central government, but seems not 
to the Legislature (Article 43)(Cheng, 1990). 
Thirdly, the autonomy of the Hong Kong people is further constrained 
by amending Article 23 in 1990, apparently resulted from the mistrust of China 
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after the June-fourth incident. The article instructs the future SAR to enact laws 
to "prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central 
People's Government, of theft of state secrets...." Such provision seems to be a 
substantial political control rather than merely a symbol of sovereignty, 
especially directed towards ASDMC and related activities. 
The above have only cited some most controversial examples which 
demonstrates the potentially all-encompassing control of China within the 
constitutional limits of the future SAR. Although the guarantee on preservation 
of the capitalist and open economy theoretically enhances much space of 
activities for the people, the political autonomy is doomed to be highly 
restricted. Socio-economic freedom, at the same time, does not logically 
transform into autonomous political power, especially when the social 
organization is still weak and electoral channels are by and large blocked. 
Consequently, political patronage becomes an inevitable requirement for 
leadership formation (Lau, 1990a). The upper government has the formal 
authority as well as informal capability of manipulation in the power grasping 
game. In order to avoid over-politicization of the society and rise of strong 
oppositional forces, China also tends to recruit political adherents at individual 
level. Political leaders, ill-equipped with mass support and ideological grounds, 
are likely to compete with each other and keenly demonstrate their abilities in 
order to gain official recognition. The contest is further intensified due to the 
limited discretionary power available. As a result, individualistic, fluidic short-
term behaviour together with mutual jealousy and mistrust among the leaders 
is easily anticipated (see also Lau, 1985), which is ultimately unfavourable for 
the convergence of political forms. 
Furthermore, as compared to the highly self-sufficient colonial 
bureaucracy, the autonomy of the political system from the society is, to a larger 
extent, plagued by the constitutional inclusion of socio-economic interests. 
Various sorts of vested interests are officially incorporated into the political 
structure through diversified means of state corporatist arrangement5. In order 
to accommodate such multiplicity of pivotal and veto groups, the administration 
will find itself greatly constrained and subjected to fragmented and contradictory 
pressures (Lau, 1988), Political leaders are, therefore, not only unable to 
establish authorities of their own, but also vulnerable to the demands and 
controls of different groups, which farther undermines their ability to form 
strong and solidary ruling coalitions. 
Limited and fragmented power components 
Even within the political system itself, political power is highly 
concentrated in the executive authorities. Only limited and fragmented power 
components are opened for competition in legislature (Lau, 1988 and 1990a). 
The segregation of the two branches, the limited statutory power of the latter 
as well as its, diversified mode of composition implies the administrative 
domination as it is in colonial governance and the dependence of legislature is 
doomed to continue (Lau, 1992). 
First, concerning the Chief Executive, he or she will be elected by an 
electoral college of 800 members, coming from various socio-economic strata. 
Such indirect election cuts the links of leaders from the general populace and 
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and non-political (institutionalized socio-economic interests) bases of power. The 
diversity and heterogeneity of leaders recruited greatly reduces their 
compatibility and capabilities to compromise with one another. Power 
aggregation becomes highly difficult and a divided and lack of discipline 
legislature is easily resulted. 
Moreover, the predominance of functional representation (which is also 
inherit in the composition of electoral college) further isolates, if not 
"powderizes" the leaders from each other. The variety of narrow, established 
socio-economic interests as well as their direct incorporation into the polity 
made them hard to be regulated and coordinated. Their secluded positions and 
limited accountability to small electorates free them from requirement of 
organization formation and dependency on parties (Lau, 1988，Louie, 1991a). 
Fragmentation and dispersion even among the institutional elites can be 
expected. 
Finally, the fragmented nature of power delegation can farther be 
generalized to the whole political structure (Lau, 1990a). Besides the mentioned 
channels, political mobility can also be sorted through appointment to official 
positions in administration as well , as to numerous advisory and para-
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administrative bodies. Direct patronage from China to enter a number of 
nationally granted positions, including the recently established "Advisors on 
Hong Kong Affairs" has also become another ascendant means of growing 
importance. The presence and strengthening of these channels outside and 
independent of the major representative bodies as well as their subjection to 
manipulation from above, in turn, further weakens the influences of the 
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legislature. The availability of alternative political means also releases the 
dependency of political leaders from organization and coalition formation (ibid). 
In brief, the future political system is characterized by its non-openness. 
Only limited and fragmented power is open for competition. The development 
of political organizations is not only blocked by the little relevance of popular 
election and mass mobilization to the access for power, but also further 
undermined by the built-in fragmentation and dispersion among the diversified 
modes of representation. Political organizations are, in fact, systemically 
excluded from the power centres and their possibility to capture and aggregate 
power is eliminated. They may eventually, either perform peripheral oppositional 
roles or being co-opted into the establishment under heavy absorption and 
patronage from the above. Strong, independent political forces are not likely to 
emergent. 
Limited socio-economic role of government 
The limited socio-economic role of the government as it is under the 
colonial government will be continued and is even incorporated into the Basic 
Law, thus being granted constitutional status (Lau, 1990a, p. 14). One of the 
most significant examples is the formalization of the restriction on government 
expenditure and the low tax policy (Articles 107，108),which implies the limited 
capacity and resources available for manipulation by tHe future government to 
carry out large scale social reforms and intervene into the society. Provided that 
private property right, free market and open economy can be maintained at the 
same time, socio-economic sectors will continue to enjoy a free operating 
57 
environment. 
Political leaders are, therefore, deprived of the capabilities to advocate 
policy reforms and large scale redistribution of social resources, their ability to 
- satisfy the mass is thus restricted. Availability of public offices and public 
resources to attract supporters is also constricted (Lau, 1992). The resulted 
compressed political arena and little demand for professional politicians makes 
its further difficult to develop a successful and long-term political career (ibid). 
The relative autonomy of socio-economic groups also inhibits them from 
extensive politicization (ibid) and their need to bid on political organizations is 
released. In short, the limited socio-economic role of the government, in 
different ways, is unconstructive to political organization formation. Although, 
it should also be added, that the vagueness and difficulties in the 
implementation of such restrictions may make them less effective than as written 
(Tang, 1990). 
To conclude this section, a number of points worth mentioned. First, 
constitutional arrangements are usually supplemented by various forms of extra-
constitutional mechanisms (Lau, 1988, p.29). Political organizations (especially 
parties) are only one of them. Under the analysis of Lau, a "governing coalition" 
is more likely to emerge and performs the functions as a "power aggregate, 
consensus builder and constructor of collective authority"6. Obviously, their 
respective positions in the future political structure will still much depend on the 
recognition of China. While political organizations are basically bottom-up, mass 
based, the role of the state in the latter as an elitist alliance is probably much 
greater. Therefore, its formation will, in turn, be highly influenced by the 
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contingent "leadership policies" from above7. Consequently, the status of political 
organization in the future political structure is also subjected to the impact of 
the nature of such arrangements which is an uncertainty. 
Second, although the Basic Law is great in detail, a number of "grey 
areas" remains unclear and require further negotiations. Their continuities and 
discontinuities with the present system have to be considered. One of them is 
notably the electoral arrangements. The division of geographical and functional 
constituencies, their seat allocations and electoral methods, as well as the 
composition and formation of the electoral college all demand further 
specification and legislation. Their impact on political organizations will be 
enormous. For instance, the present simple plurality voting system in popular 
election is thought to favour particular candidates, and if being replaced by some 
form of proportional representation system, the results of election will likely be 
altered8. While those in the future are still uncertainties, what seems to be 
certain is the influences of China in the determination process. 
Third and most importantly, the development of political organizations 
is, obviously, also highly subjected to the shaping of socio-economic factors, as 
discussed in the last chapter. What needs to be added is, the politico-
institutional arrangements, partially as a reflection of the contestation among 
such forces, demonstrates systematic bias towards particular socio-economic 
strata and its impact on different groups may greatly varies. Therefore, instead 
of treating them as identical, the opportunity structures and situational facilities 
of various major types of organizations will further be differentiated and 
compared in greater details in the following section. 
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2. Institutional locations and opportunity structures: a prospect 
Modes of Political Representation 
To use different words, the political structure laid down by the Basic Law 
is characterized by the co-existence of diversified modes of political 
representation. Undoubtedly, on one hand, its explicitly denotes the fragmented 
nature of power delegation. On the other hand, however, it also reveals the 
implicit contradictions and paradoxes built-in the political design (Lau, 1988). 
In brief, they can more or less be represented by the following pairs of 
dichotomies: authoritarianism vs. democracy, elitism vs. popularism, 
administration vs. election, control vs. autonomy, centralization vs. 
decentralization, etc. Each of the first element of the pairs will probably be the 
dominant characteristics of the future political system. While the remainders, 
though subordinated, are still intrinsic and substantial. Survival niches for mass 
political organizations and civil political forces are still preserved, though largely 
limited. This is especially true if considerations of China to promote the 
confidence of Hong Kong people, to uphold her image in international 
community and to provide a good example for Taiwan (Cheng, 1990) continue 
to have their validities, and consequently, "the Chinese Government will not 
make extensive and arbitrary use of the power conferred on her by the Basic 
Law." (Lau, 1988，p.3) 
In sum, various modes of political representation can be schematized as 
follows9. Basically, the institutional characteristics of the four major modes 
(namely A to D as indicated) with reference to their relative positions in the 
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political structure are differentiated in Figure 5. The organizational 
characteristics of corresponding contenders in such positions are demonstrated 
in Figure 6 (also coded as types A to D in congruence). While in Figure 7，of 
possible socio-political forces contending within each of them, illustrated by 
several existing, empirical examples, are further displayed. 
Figure 5. Modes of Political Representation in Hong Kong 
Power Base 
Political Socio-Economic 
Civil Electoral Politics Social 
Society (A) Movement 
(B) 
Structural Location 





Figure 6. Organizational Characteristics of Contenders in Various Modes of 
Political Representation 
Level of concern 
GeneraL Specific 





Elitist Patronage Socio-Economic 
Networks Groups 
(C) (D) 
Note: Type A & B resembles type I & II organizations in Chapter II. 1. The 
relevance of organizational factor may greatly vary. 




Civil United Democrats Federation of Trade 
Society of HK (UDHK) Unions (FTU) 
Structural 
Location 
State New HK Cooperative 
Alliance (NHKA) Resource Centre 
(CRC) 
Note: Above are ideal-typical illustration only. Contenders may merely be 
individual members of these forces. Most forces may also utilize multiple channels 
of ascendancy. 
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The logic of formation and functions for various modes of political 
representation are different. More importantly, their political relevance and 
power potentials also vary. But in the meantime, all of them occupy at least 
some political space in the complex power-grasping arena and will probably 
continue to do so. Fundamentally, they form not only the opportunity structures 
and situational facilities for various groups and strata,but also responsible for 
shaping the courses of political organization developments as well as their 
interaction patterns. 
First of all, their capacities in accessing power greatly vary. The concrete 
locations of various modes of representation is presented diagrammatically in 
Figure 8，incorporated in the political structure of Hong Kong10. Apparently, 
political appointment and corporatist arrangement predominate major political 
organs, they together form the genuine sources of formal power. While the 
former occupies major influential and symbolic official positions, the latter 
masters the functional elections of legislature as well as the electoral college. 
Contrarily, popular election only constitute a minor portion of (33% in 1995) of 
the legislature the possibility of its returned members to capture even the 
representative body is eliminated. Popular election seems to be most relevant 
only to district representative bodies with little statutory power. Of course, social 
movements and pressure groups activities will basically be excluded from the 
institutional means at all. 
Second, the penetrability of China influence (as well as that of Britain 
before 1997) also varies. On the whole, she is the ultimate source of power in 
the future SAR and her ability of manipulation from above is sufficiently 
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guaranteed under the political design. The degree of autonomy for various 
modes of representation, however, still depends on their own logic of formation. 
Comparatively, among individually based patronage and political appointment 
of major officials including the Chief Executive, the formal authority that lies 
directly in hands of Chinese officials is enormous. While on the contrary, group 
based functional representation enjoys larger autonomy and prerogatives (Lau, 
1988), which cannot be removed unless through constitutional changes. Though 
their subjection to informal influences is still great and mass politicization is 
avoided. Political parties and pressure groups, basically operating outside the 
state structure, are predominantly bottom-up constituted and mass bounded, the 
possibility of exclusive control exerted from above largely reduces. 
Third and most importantly, there is significantly socio-economic bias 
built-in the political structure, under which middle-lower class, grassroot interests 
are systematically excluded. Such bias is a direct reflection of the "consensus" on 
maintenance of the status quo and avoidance of rapid social reforms. "The 
previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years." 
(Article 5, Basic Law) It also represents China's deliberation to gain the support 
of vested interests and preserves "stability and prosperity" in Hong Kong. Under 
the new system, the rights and privileges originally protected under the relative 
independent colonial government is further granted constitutional status, while 
the political influences of socio-economic elites are formally endorsed and 
greatly enhanced. As Lau (1990a) observes, "In the old colonial system, the 
dominant socio-economic interests are heavily dependent on official recognition, 
but under the new arrangements they even have a role to play in determining 
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who the new rulers of Hong Kong are." (p. 16) 
As a matter of fact, the design of functional elections is by and large 
inaccessible to the grassroots. Over 90% of the population are deprived right to 
vote in them. Groups granted representative status cluster in commercial, 
industrial and upper professional strata. Past experiences show that many of the 
candidates in functional elections are returned uncontested and positions 
endured. The same logic is equally included into the electoral college, in which 
the proportion of lower class representatives will also be outweighed (Annex I, 
Basic Law). Concerning direct political patronage, the authoritarian nature and 
capability of manoeuvre from above further diminishes the possibility of 
grassroot participation. Consequently, it will only be popular elections and extra-
institutional means that are relatively accessible to the underrepresented strata. 
In general, the different foundations and properties of diversified modes 
of political representation as well as their relative accessibility to various socio-
economic strata unavoidably has huge impact on the loci of political 
oragnization development. Adding up with the emergent, concrete political 
circumstances to be illustrated below, a general comparison of the institutional 
locations and mobility potentials for the several broad socio-political forces11: the 
pro-China forces, the conservatives and the liberals, can tentatively be created. 
The political consequences on interorganizational relations can also be partially 
revealed. 
Pro-China Forces 
Undeniably, China as the ultimate source of power in the future SAR, 
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her close followers are most likely to be direct beneficiaries. Since major 
authorities lies in the executive, China has great capacity in rewarding those 
followers straightly through patronage and appointments. In fact, "the pro-China 
forces have been the only organized political force besides the colonial 
government for a very long time. Any governing coalition that excludes the pro-
China forces is not likely to survive, if not to say operate effectively." (Lau, 1988， 
p.34). 
Evidences show that the forces is gradually enlarging, and the united 
front strategy of China in the past decade, though hindered by June-fourth 
incident, is still highly effective. Colonial established elites have by time shaken 
their loyalties to Britain, businessmen have from early actively been seeking 
their protection under China, though the nature of relationship and distance 
from China may greatly vary. In meantime, core pro-China forces can mainly be 
represented by traditional patriotic elites including NPC representatives, One 
Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute and the newly emerged New 
Hong Kong Alliance (all of which played active roles in the Basic Law drafting 
process), as well as mass organizations including the Federation of Trade Unions 
(FTU). 
They are，however, still likely to be disturbed by a chain of problems. 
First of all, their，pro-China，images can hardly receive general support due to 
the mistrust and anti-communist sentiments of the public especially if China-
Hong Kong conflict is not to be moderated within short period. Their，use value， 
to China in ruling the future SAR also greatly depreciated. Second, in terms of 
organizational strength, except few mass organizations, most of them are small 
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in size, extremely elitist and exclusive, and links with the grassroots are virtually 
non-exist. Third, they are almost totally excluded from the colonial 
administration. Though China's participation in decision-making of Hong Kong 
in late-transitional period is expanding, it largely remains as the level of upper 
government and the ability of pro-China forces to penetrate into the 
administration is still weak. The lack of governing experiences become 
significant obstacles (Lau, 1988) if sudden transfer of power has to be taking 
place in 1997. 
Most important of all, the pro-China forces, not a direct extension of the 
cohesive Communist Party, are highly fragmented and its composition 
diversified. Apparent cleavages can be observed especially between old and new 
elements, as well as between upper class and grassroot organizations (see Lau, 
1988). Ascendancy through patronage and appointment as well as perceptions 
of wide open opportunities also tend to induce internal competition and conflict 
for official recognition. United organization is structurally discouraged. Recent 
disputes on the appointment of Advisors on Hong Kong Affairs have 
demonstrated the problem thoroughly even if the positions are symbolic in 
nature. 
Undoubtedly, China will become the only factor that can integrate such 
forces. Whether China will take an active role in regulating them is uncertain 
for, on one hand, China may not be willing to take high profile to avoid 
damaging the general confidence on "one country, two systems" and adversary 
reactions from the public. On the other hand, some degree of dispersion may 
even further facilitate China's role as an arbiter of interests among them as well 
68 
as between them other political forces. Eventually, the policy of China to 
intervene more or less will probably depends on, if not all, whether China-Hong 
Kong conflict further intensifies and her interests may be significantly affected, 
or whether the SAR suffers from serious internal crisis which hampers the 
maintenance of political stability. 
The situation of the popularist pro-China forces is quite different. Besides 
enjoying top-down patronage, they also seek for mass support and strengthen 
grassroot organizations simultaneously to promote their bargaining power12. 
Tliey seem to adopt a moderate role in order to avoid both total submergence 
to Chinese official control or total reliance oil the mass, but the two poles have 
to be carefully balanced and such strategy can easily be labelled as opportunistic 
and unprincipled. Their political relevance, therefore, will also be likely to 
depend on whether China-Hong Kong conflict can be to a certain extent 
lessened and the mass resume their pragmatism towards China. 
Conservatives 
The conservatives, also known as the business group, represent the vested 
interests of local socio-economic elites. As indicated above, their rights and 
privileges will continue to be well protected at present under the British 
sovereignty, and under that of China in the future. Their influences are farther 
promoted through the granting of direct access into the polity by means of 
functional representation as well as political patronage. As the influences of 
Britain begin to fade, all of its members tend to search for more cooperation 
with China and their demarcation with the pro-China forces will be increasingly 
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blurred. Meanwhile, they are thought to be including the major local capitalists 
and upper professionals, as well as political organizations like Liberal 
Democratic Federation (LDF), Hong Kong Foundation (HKF) and Federation 
of Business and Professionals of Hong Kong (FPB), but also the Cooperative 
Resource Centre (CRG) established by office holding institutional elites which 
owns a more 'pro-British' image. 
CRC enjoys a unique position for its occupation of predominant seats in 
both the Exco and Legco and attracts much attentions. Political experience and 
public fidelity of its members is probably their greatest capital. Evidences show 
that they gradually seek independence from the colonial administration and 
develop a new collaborate relationship with the latter. The opportunity to 
demonstrate their capacities and gratify the utilitarian mass through direct 
participation in decision-making process is available. In reality, to preserve their 
status during political transition, they must gain solid social base outside colonial 
patronage. However, it will also become a debt if they are unable to manage the 
emergent socio-economic conflicts properly as well as to assist the retreating 
British to maintain effective governance. Their 'pro-British' background also 
casts mistrusts from the Chinese officials as well as the pro-China forces, though 
China may also to some extent rely on them to enhance peaceful transition and 
to curb anti-communist elements. In brief, the structural locations of CRC is full 
of contradictions and paradoxes. How can it balance between the interests of 
Britain, China as well as gaining general public support will probably be a highly 
challenging and complicated task requiring great political skill13. 
Besides that of CRC, a number of problems have also to be faced by the 
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conservatives in general. Basically, their principal objective is the advancement 
of socio-economic interests rather than practising power. The amateur essence 
is particularly evident and the shortage of political leaders or political agents is 
especially serious. As Ng elegantly puts it (1990),".....there is basically no 
difference between a businessman being an amateur at politics and a teacher, 
social worker or academic in the same role-except that the businessman is more 
likely to protest that he really had no wish to get into politics because he has 
better things to do." 
Second, the upper class in Hong Kong is poorly organized (Lau, 1987). 
The irelitist outlook and privileged status in the political system prevents them 
from rapidly consolidating themselves. The political organizations they form are 
thus loosely composed, lack of principle and direction as well as lack of wider 
social support even when compared with the financially inferior liberals. Some 
of them tend to promote moderate，cross-class，party line to extend their 
audiences in the mass, but their political image is ambiguous and the 
prominence is easily over-shadowed14. In brief, besides passively preserving the 
status quo, the conservatives are generally hesitant and lack the confidence to 
take up a more active political role. 
Most important of all, the reliance of the conservatives on functional 
representation will tend to induce great internal division and fragmentation 
among its members. They would find It extremely difficult to accommodate a 
vast variety of autonomous, institutionalized socio-economic interests which tend 
to contradict with each other (Lau, 1988). The lack of solidarity within the 
present political organizations can also be partially explained. Unity and 
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formation of strong parties based in the futurte on functional groups would 
doom to be problematic. 
Once again, China is likely to become the capable integrating agent. 
Though her motivation is still uncertain. Moreover, the foreign elements in many 
functional groups as well as the possible contradiction between those capitalists 
and the socialist state may become latent sources of tension (Lau, 1988). Besides 
the China factor, intensified class conflict (Lau, 1990b) and the strengthening of 
oppositional forces perceived as a threat (which can also be partially revealed 
in the formation of CRC) will probably be another inducement for the 
conservatives to unite themselves. However, the effect should not be over-
estimated for, on one hand, the business sector enjoys great socio-economic 
autonomy and will remains to be undisturbed by government policies. On the 
other hand, they are reactively protecting their possessions rather than actively 
advocating their interests. Their initiatives based on these considerations will still 
be doubtful. In brief, they will continue to preserve core influential positions in 
the political system, partially under the backup of China. But the possibility of 
developing into a crystallized, fully armed independent political entity will 
remain misty. 
Liberals 
Contrary to the above two forces, the liberals are characterized by their 
peripheral positions in the power structure. Being a society originated, grassroot 
based socio-political force, they, although enjoy relatively better mass appeals, 
are effectively expelled from the major access to formal power. Popular elections 
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and mass mobilizations which they rely on, only form a minor, if not totally 
insignificant component of the modes of representation. What they could 
depend, until then, is the adoption of a critical role of establishment and exerts 
pressure altogether through mass movements. 
The June-fourth incident, which symbolizes the turning of their 
development, has double-edged effects. One on hand, needless to say, the 
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liberals enjoy mass identification which they have longed for. On the other hand, 
they are pushed into a deep pool of antagonism with the future sovereign, to 
which their political prospects connects. Though the landslide success in the 
1991 Legco direct election has significant improved their confidence and 
bargaining power, a number of problems still plague them all the time. 
First, the maintenance of mass sentiments as the imagery of June-fourth 
blurs and 1997 approaches becomes difficult (Lau, 1990a). China-Hong Kong 
conflict is not likely to be an enduring attraction to mobilize support especially 
under the political realism of the general public. Most of the leaders also realize 
the need to resume dialogue with China. Second, their present oppositional role 
within the establishment, through raises media exposure, does not provide any 
substantial results. Their challenges over-eroding the colonial administration may 
also receive adversary effects. The aroused attentions of the public can hardly 
be satisfied and frustrations on the unfulfilled promises are likely to follow. The 
downward trends of support received from the materialistic mass are likely to 
spread15. 
Third, although they do not rely on China's acceptance as their major 
source of influence, they are still vulnerable to the control from above. Under 
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the，through-train，modd of 1997 transition, whether the existing Legco members 
are qualified to retain their seats still depends on the confirmation by the 
Preparatory Committee of future SAR under the NPC. The activities and 
opinions of liberal organizations will also be checked by the Basic Law (e.g. 
Article 23 and 79.7). Fourth, the liberals are, more fundamentally, vulnerable to 
the tactics of threat and isolation as well as divide and rule applied by the 
Chinese officials through their central positions in the political system, which will 
be extensively dealt with in the next chapter. 
In general, the limited power available for open contest as well as the 
amorphous mass support received by the liberals irresistibly has important 
organizational impact. The weakness in solidarity and organizational discipline, 
the poverty in ideological substance as well as the individualistic and 
opportunistic mentality of the leaders are some general features previously 
discussed. However, comparatively speaking, the structural locations they 
situated still provide some favourable conditions which may promote 
cooperation and convergence of efforts. 
Basically, though mobility potential of popular election is restricted and 
thus inducive to internal competition among the leaders, the disintegrating 
effects is relatively small when compared with the structurally differentiated 
functional mode of representation. The autonomy from upper control also 
facilitates authority formation. Furthermore, the present electoral system may 
even be partially in favour of power aggregation. For instance, the double seated 
constituencies of 1991 Legco election are thought to be in favour alliance 
formations and the enlarged scale favours mass mobilization and media 
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attraction of candidates with strong organizational background. While the simple 
plurality voting system, offering principal parties seats larger than 
proportionality, favours political conglomerations. Again, the spatial 
homogeneity and lack of territorial based cleavages in Hong Kong makes the 
divisive effects of geographical constituencies insignificant17. 
China-Hong Kong relations 
However, it will then be assumed that other modes of representation will 
continue to be inaccessible for the liberals to a large extent. Such assumption 
will become unrealistic if major power holders, including China herself, intend 
to selectively coopt some moderate liberal organizations into the "governing 
coalition" (Lau, 1988) with strong political inducements or material attractions. 
The existence of alternative channels will probably fundamentally alters the 
opportunity structures of the liberal organizations and has much organizational 
impact. Obviously, variations in modes of ascendency and power base will create 
tensions among political leaders or organizations. Also, the common identity of 
political opposition and grassroot representative will be broken up. Finally, the 
uncompromising amateur mentality will further deepen the gap in forms of 
ideological accusations. � 
To a certain extent, the moderate liberal organizations (notably MP and 
ADPL) represent an effort to balance between the Chinese officials from above 
and the mass tendencies underneath. However, their influences and voices are 
weak due to their limited social base and their middle of roader images can 
easily be overshadowed by more acute and emotional political claims. Their 
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positions may even be more likely to be affected by the ever-evolving political 
circumstances and vulnerable to be perceived as opportunistic and unprincipled. 
Ultimately, their political market will remain to be depending on the future of 
China-Hong Kong conflict. 
The possibility of the moderates as a whole to lean on China's acceptance 
is still limited, however, for on one hand, the ultimate source of power such 
organizations rely on is still electoral support. Regardless of sentimental changes 
within the mass, too obvious shifts and fluctuations of the leaders will doom to 
destroy their public appeal, as well as their bargaining power and political 
capital facing China. On the other hand, mistrusts between Chinese officials and 
the liberals deposited in the past may not be easily softened. The pursuit of 
political patronage, though a more，effective，channel, still encounters intense 
competition and problems of mutual accommodation with the pro-China and 
conservative forces. The limited power components are, although unevenly 
distributed, still a fundamental defining characteristics of the whole political 
system. 
Class Relations 
Concerning internal political circumstances of Hong Kong, although the 
socio-economic role of the government is limited and the 'autonomy，of the 
society is preserved and interests groups prevented from over-politicization. The 
limited public involvement is, however, highly correlated with the daily life 
experiences of the middle-lower class people whom the liberals based on. The 
worsening of the economy as well as the retreats of government from 
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commitments on service provisions are likely to have much impact on them. 
Intensified class conflict and lower class activism resulted will probably imply 
significant political implications18. 
On one hand, although large scale redistribution is out of possibility and 
demand of the mass can be hardly satisfied, the general deprivation and political 
demand aroused may still strengthen the ideological base and public appeal of 
the liberals. The public concern on the problems raised by the，rose garden， 
plan~the huge infrastructural development project may further generate anti-
British sentiments the liberals can exploit of. On the other hand, the 
dichotomization and manifestation of social cleavages further form the 
conditions for unification of dispersed socio-economic forces and gathering of 
limited resources to combat the major opponents. Internal disputes can hope to 
be temporarily frozen or diverted. 
However, at the same time, the effects should not be over-estimated. 
Most importantly, the labour forces are still extremely fragmented and 
disorganized. Labour unions are not only small in scale and low in level of 
unionization, but also being further fragmented by political background and 
power struggle (Leung and Chiu, 1991). Moreover, the market position and 
bargaining capacity of labour may even be farther hampered by the economic 
adversary conditions. Individualistic and self-seeking behaviour rather than 
collective actions may be resulted instead. In short, grievances and discontent 
may not logically produce the direct effect of politicization at all19. 
Pressure groups with liberal background have their own distinctive 
opportunity structure. Unlike upper-middle class socio-economic groups, their 
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chances to occupy functional representation status is minimized.20 Their 
capability to exert influence through other administrative and consultative bodies 
is also limited. The introduction of popular elections, though attracts some of 
the activists, also creates dilemmas to such organizations which are largely non-
geographically based, specific issue oriented and sectoral interest laden. The 
restricted power capacity of direct election also deter many from relying on it. 
As a result, extra-institutional means to combat government, e.g. rallies, 
demonstrations, petitions and signature campaigns etc. are frequently employed. 
They are, at the same time, frequently joined forces by liberal parties and 
official holders who also realize their limitations within the political institutions. 
Territorial wide coalitions can often be found in critical events carrying mass 
grievances and an oppositional front directed towards government can still be 
more or less identified. • 
In general, the impact of political institutions and emergent circumstances 
on interorganizational relationships of the liberals is far from clear .The 
disintegrating effects of the political system and objective political circumstances 
is comparatively lower than that to the others. To a certain extent, their reliance 
on popular elections as well as the class based grievances they articulate even 
provide some opportunities of political conglomeration. The politico-institutional 
factor alone, therefore, apparently does not offer a complete account for the 
inter-organizational relationships among the liberals. 
On the whole, the foregoing two approaches being discussed in this and 
the previous chapter are still less than satisfactory. On one hand, they are still 
too macroscopic and over-generalized. They only offers a totalistic view of 
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general political organizations or liberal political organizations as a whole and 
fail to delimit the focus onto concrete situations of particular set of 
organizations. On the other hand, the above approaches are too mechanical and 
over-deterministic. They outline the external environmental constraints and 
possibilities rather than looking into the interpretations and adaptations of 
political actors facing them* In Gambetta's words, they discuss the fence but not 
seeing the actual behaviour of the cattle within it directly (1988). In short, the 
capacity of making strategic choices by the calculative actors in response to the 
environment are neglected from being studied. 
The contrast between the forecoming holistic models and the foregoing 
situational model can tentatively be compared to the two models of collective 
action offered by Tilly (1978，p.52). His polity model provides a vague, systemic 
illustration of the macro power structure, demonstrating the relative positions 
of the contenders and their accessibility to the polity. While the mobilization 
model offers a more substantial, interactive account for the mobilization process 
of collective action of single actors. While the former is largely static, the latter 
is dynamic and evolutionary. The two models are, however, tackling different 
levels of reality rather than pushing contradictory views. They can ultimately 
form complementary and supplementary components of theoretical 
constructions. This will be probably be the same case in the present study. 
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IV. Inter-party relationships: strategic choices of adaptive elites 
1. Prologue 
Before entering into substantial discussion, several theoretical issues of 
the following study emphasizing on the strategic choices of adaptive elites under 
institutional constraints should be clarified. In sum, three basic assumptions or 
abstract principles are constructed. 
Rationality 
First, in line with the rational choice approach, the rationality of the 
political actors is assumed. Such assumption is characterized by Gambetta (1988) 
as "the pulled-from-the front view" in contrast to "the pushed-from-behind view" 
of human behaviour as following, 
"My point is that it is not necessarily wrong to think 
of some form of behaviour as caused by forces that 
are not perceived by the subject, but that it would 
be mistaken to think of all relevant social behaviour 
as explicable in this way and, even more so, to 
discount people's reason for action a priori."(p-13) 
"[The pulled] approach in general assumes that 
individuals act purposively in accordance with their 
intentions: when they are faced with multiple 
courses of action, it predicts that they will weigh 
them up and choose according to some expected 
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future reward attached to each course of action. 
Individuals are here view not so much as pushed 
from behind as attracted from the front (emphasis 
added)„H (p.16) 
Two major points are revealed here. On one hand, a rational approach 
need not resemble the strict economistic assumptions such as utility 
maximization and perfect information. Reasonable enough, though, human 
actions can still more or less be viewed as goal-oriented and reward-seeking1. On 
the other hand, also more importantly, actions are viewed in this way as guided 
by forward inducement or expected pavoffs in the future, rather than by inertia 
forces predisposed in the past. In Elster's words (1991)，the rational choice view 
are "conditional" and "outcome-oriented". The differences have enormous 
implications. "The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the 
lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, adhering 
to the prescribed behaviour even if new and apparently better options become 
available." (ibid. p. 109), Notably, a rational approach can especially facilitate the 
exploration on the adaptive behaviour of strategic elites in facing the rapidly 
changing political circumstances. The contingency and subtlity of political actions 
are here emphasized. * 
Further made explicit in Turner's words (1991)，"Rational decision models 
that assumes self-interest are useful in generating hypothesis about the nature 
of situational constraints or, more expansively, the coercive effects of social 
structure on human behaviour." (p. 104). Through the case studies of MP and 
ADPL, the opportunities and constraints imposed by the political environment 
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as well as the possible courses of development for the political organizations can 
more fruitfully be revealed. The emergent and fluidic nature of political 
phenomenon can be more systematically grasped. 
One step further, is it well-justified to assume the political actors be not 
only rational but even self-interested? Such problem is equally queried by 
Gambetta (1988) who choose a similar approach, 
"Everyone is seen as acting according to the 
objective 'the more the better，, where，the more，is 
overwhelmingly taken to refer to material goods 
and well-being." (p. 18) 
"On the whole much of the rational choice theory 
has confined itself to the rather narrow interstices 
between preferences and constraints, both of which 
are taken as given." (p.20) 
In Gambetta's words, "questions of this sort are not easy to answer." 
(ibid.) In the present study, however, the self-seeking and inward-looking 
mentality of the strategic elites are not only presupposed analytically, but also 
grounded empirically. The cultural foundations discussed in Chapter II 
demonstrates a clear picture of the individualistic and elitist, calculative and 
utilitarian political entrepreneurs, which not only partially explains their 
structurally determined interrelationships, but also provides a sociological base 
for further understanding of their strategic interactions. Cohen (1985) comments 
on Tilly's contribution to the RMT in this way, "His analysis provides an 
historical justification for utilitarian theories of collective action, in so far as the 
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development of the capitalist market economy and the nation-state privilege 
strategic-instrumental calculations." (p,677) Through the present study does not 
offers a historical framework, the knowledge of wider social context still more 
or less justifies adopting an approach rested upon instrumental rationality. 
Organization 
Second, in line with the RMT, the organizational factor is also 
emphasized. Basically, RMT concerns more on the strategic problems of "how" 
a movement is set up and maintained rather than the problems of identity for 
"why" it is initiated (Melucci, 1989，Cohen, 1985). Central to such perspective, 
for instance, is the concept of SMO2. SMO is ultimately responsible for 
identifying the goal of a movement and implement it through effective 
aggregation and allocation of resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Concerning 
other types of political organizations, the same logic still applies3. The 
intellectual roots of RMT in organization theory is further made clear by Zald 
and McCarthy (1980)， 
"In the past, social rilovement analysts and analysts 
of complex organizations spoke rather different 
languages. In our" attempt to merge these two 
approaches, we will utilize the concerns and 
conceptualizations of both. Our earlier work has 
been informed by the perspectives of organizational 
theory and research in general." (p.2) 
As an earlier version of the RMT, the contribution of Wilson (1973) 
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whose approach this study also follows, even adopts a more explicit 
organizational approach for the study of "political organizations" in general, 
"...that many persons active in politics and policy 
making, in and out of government, are persons 
speaking f for，or acting as part of, formal 
organizations and that the constraints and 
requirements imposed by their organizational roles 
are of great significance in explaining their 
behaviour. To understand their behaviour it is 
necessary to examine the internal processes of 
organizations to discover how they are formed, why 
people join them, how leaders and policies and 
selected, and by what strategies they deal with other 
organizations…”（p.9) 
The problems concerning internal organizational environment, especially 
those of organizational maintenance and members participation, together with 
their effects on inter-organizational relationships will be effectively demonstrated 
in the next sections. Besides, the organizational factor is also crucial for the 
following reasons. Primarily, as "organized" political participation is gaining 
momentum in Hong Kong, individual leaders will tend to be increasingly 
constrained by their organizational context. Moreover, when compared with 
other political forces, political organizations of the liberals are comparatively 
more well-established partially due to the need for electoral mobilizations. The 
relevance of "organization" factor to them is relatively larger. Last but not the 
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least, provided the fact that multiple organizations coexist in the political arena 
and inter-organizational relationships among the liberals are the basic concern, 
insights drawn from organization theory which places much attention on these 
topics probably worth incorporation. 
Environmental constraints 
Third, the environmental constraints of political organizations is further 
emphasized4. Though external support or repression is also one of the major 
concerns of RMT (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), the macro political context is in 
reality often overlooked5. As Perrow (1979) comments on RMT, "Political 
factors are present, of course, even as they are in traditional collective behaviour 
interpretations; but they are there as limits, not as engines.11 (p.201) As a matter 
of fact, such problem is also recognized by the contributors themselves, "The 
propositions are heavily based on the American case, so that the impact of 
societal differences in development and political structure on social movements 
is unexplored…（emphasis added)" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977，p. 1213) But little 
work has even been done6. 
As a result, it will not be surprising for Kitschelt (1986) to find that 
, empirical RMT studies "concentrate on those internal variables of movement 
mobilization that are deemed to be within an incipient movements 
discretion....[ignoring] the strategic choices and societal impacts of movements 
to specific properties of the external political organization opportunity structures 
that movements face. Such institutional constraints have often been simply 
assumed, rather than systematically and comparatively used to explain social 
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movements' trajectories (emphasis added)." (p.59-60). It will be, therefore, a 
major task in this study to integrate the general propositions drawn from RMT 
with the knowledge of the specific socio-political features under the Hong Kong 
context. Again the issue of embeddedness is raised (Granovetter, 1985). The 
economistic，atomistic s and decontextual bias of RMT can hoped to be 
prevented, for which adaptive behaviour of individual actors should be 
understood with reference to the institutional locations and situational 
constraints and an undersocialized conception of man should be avoided7. 
Multiorganizational field 
Besides the above assumptions, another central concept~the multi-
organizational field-is also fundamental to the present study. For McCarthy and 
Zald (1977), the adoption of the terms SMO and SMI explicitly implies 
movements are typically represented by more than one SMO. Inter-
organizational interactions logically becomes one of the major concerns of RMT. 
Nevertheless, academic works on this specific topic are rare. The major 
propositions this study draws come from Zald and McCarthy (1980), as well as 
Wilson (1973), Staggenborg (1986)，Panebianco (1988) and Klandermans 
(1990)8. \ . 
Discussions on them will not be detailed here but in the respective 
locations. Still, a general typology of the related contributions is presented here 
for the sake of clarification (Figure 9). In brief, the three dimensions for 
conceptualizing inter-organizational relationships represent the upward 
(interactions with institutional authorities and oppositional political forces), 
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horizontal (linkages of membership and leadership among the concerning 
organizations) and downward (facing mass and the general public) dramatic 
stages of political performance each organization responsible to play on. Each 
dimension will be dealt with in the following sections independently through 
applying onto the liberal parties. 
Figure 9. A Survey of Related Academic Contributions on Multi-organizational 
Field 
Dimensions Related Contributions 
External Threats and opportunities H4, 8，11，13; Wilson; Staggenborg; 
Klandermans 
Inter-organizational Linkages H9, 10，14; Wilson; Staggenborg; 
Panebianco 
Problems of Mobilizations HI, 3，5, 7; Wilson 
Note: "HI... 14" denotes the fourteen hypotheses purposed by Zald and McCarthy 
(1980). H2, 6，12 are provisionally dropped due to their little relevances. 
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2. External threats and opportunities 
United front strategy 
First consider two events. 
In 1986, as a reaction to the Group of 51, a Group of 190 and 
consequently the JCPDG, though loosely knitted, was formed by over 100 
political organizations, who are latter labelled as the liberals in the course of 
Basic Law consultation. 
In 1989, as a reaction to the glowing Chinese democratic movement, 
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ASDMC, with the liberals as backbone, was formed. Soon after the June-fourth 
incident, the liberal leaders announced the plan to establish the UDHK as a 
unitary liberal party. 
At a first glance, the two events can seldom be related. However, it is 
asserted here that with careful examination they have striking continuities. First, 
each denotes a pivotal point of development for the liberals, history seems to 
turn its direction at the particular moment9. Second, both reflect a large scale 
conglomeration of liberal political forces. Two federated bodies, JCPDG and 
ASDMC, were consequently formed and maintain a unitary image stably over 
an enduring period. Third, in both cases, surprisingly, the，target，of the grouping 
is in fact the Chinese government, the ultimate source of power of post 1997 
Hong Kong. What are the implications underneath such phenomenon? 
Remarkably, in the prolonged transitional period towards 1997，the 
liberals have gradually evolved as the major oppositional force in facing China. 
Conflicts emerged in incidents like the Daya Bay, Public Order Ordinance, Basic 
Law and 1988 direct election controversies, etc. In times, the liberals are added 
with the hats "counter-communist" or "communist phobia". For the Chinese 
authorities, in order to resume the sovereignty of Hong Kong stably and 
preserves her ultimate control, restricting the upsurging resistant forces will 
become an essential task. Policies and developments in China, in turn, 
unavoidably heavily affect the orientations and strategies of the liberals. China, 
as a result, becomes an essential, if not single catalyst responsible to shape and 
reshape the actions and interactions among the liberals, but in what sense? 
In the case of Basic Law debates, the great resistance of China and 
conservative forces on political reform as well as China's revealed intention to 
tighten her control could be apparently perceived as a common threat to liberals 
whose up-rise was traced back to the optimism and confidence largely based on 
the Joint Declaration and the promise of "Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong". 
In the case of June-fourth incident, however, the matter became much more 
complicated. On one hand, the already heightened mass sentiments prompted 
a rare opportunity to boost their public appeal. On the other hand, the delayed 
response of the liberals during the event also revealed their hesitation and 
caution for annoying the Chinese government. Their eventual commitment into 
the event implied a trade-off. After the tragic crackdown, the immediate plan 
to establish UDHK, again, reflected two sides of the reality. On one side, the 
move demonstrated an attempt to，internalize，the movement back into Hong 
Kong to stimulate further political reform, particularly under the aroused public 
support. On the other side, it also represented a defence against the enormous 
pressure from the post June-fourth Chinese Government which is still in hands 
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of the hardliners. In sum, the incident created both significantly a common 
opportunity and threat to the liberals. 
Zald and McCarthy (1980) predicts that "social control procedures 
increased cooperation among SMOs when the social control effects threaten the 
very existence of a number of SMOs" (H8)10. Such assertion provides a simple 
and direct interpretation of the above historical facts. The worsening external 
situations reinforce the common perceptions of an urgent need to pool resources 
for maintaining their political relevances as a whole, such that internal 
differences and boundary consciousness across liberal political organizations 
have to be put aside. However, Wilson (1973) and Staggenborg (1986) further 
extend the logic to situations of exceptional opportunities for interest 
advancement in which individual organizations are incapable to take advantage 
of and the urgency to join forces is also raised. This is especially true when there 
is a chance of "victory" (Staggenborg, 1986，p.380), in which shared goal 
achievements become more salient than organizational maintenance needs11. 
Nevertheless, the same argument also implies that in order to preserve 
individual organizations' identity, coalition maintenance becomes difficult when 
the environmental conditions return to normal (ibid.). 
This conceptual framework pan by and large apply at present Hong Kong v 
context and evidences can demonstrate why coalition work is highly problematic. 
First, soon after the june-fourth incident, though China-Hong Kong relationship 
was harshly disrupted and waves of verbal attack by Chinese officials were still 
threatening to the confidence of the general people, the activists soon realized 
that the Joint Declaration would still have to be implemented and the need to 
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face China could not be avoided. Any attempt of complete opposition with 
China would doom to be highly unrewarding. Second, even more significantly, 
China, though also lost trust on Hong Kong people and even many of her 
followers, was still able to restrain herself and selectively single out individual 
targets to shift the blames onto. The top-most ASDMC leaders, and most 
notably Mr. Szeto Wah and Martin Lee, were all the time isolated and 
attacked12- The inability of the UDHK to form a unitary party had already 
revealed the effectiveness of such strategy. 
Third, most importantly, the "threat" of China had never realized in 
substantial terms/ Under colonial protection and insulation from the mainland 
events as well as China's intention to maintain prosperity of the territory, Hong 
Kong people have never been deteriorated the freedom to voice or even 
freedom to protest. Lack of persecution have made the liberal leaders feel 
personally safe (Lau, 1991a) even during the hardtimes of 1989. At the extremes, 
as middle class elites, they can find their ways out easily through emigration and 
fade out of politics13. In short, the unavailability of "martyrs" but the 
predominance of "amateurs" inevitably makes the liberals short of collective will 
and group solidarity. 
. Looking at different side of the same coin, China's divide and rule 
strategy remains and probably will continue to be the major source of 
fragmentation and division among the liberal parties14. The common threat has 
substantially be "decomposed" as isolated opportunities or threats to individual 
contenders. Organizational boundaries unavoidably become the pressure points 
that are likely to be made use of. China, as the ultimate sovereign of Hong 
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Kong, has much formal authorities and informal power to reward and sanction 
the political game participants through the application of selective incentives. 
Her central position enables her tactics to take multi-dimensional forms. In one 
aspect, temptations of power, prestige and economic advantages can be 
employed as great attractions (Cheng, 1989a). In another aspect, moral appeals 
like patriotism and psychological satisfactions of connected with authorities can 
be resorted to (Lau, 1988). In the past, the former chairman of MP, being 
appointed as representative of the People's Political Consultative Conference 
and the chairman of NHKS, whose relations with the liberals being broken, can 
be perceived as signs of success resulted from the strategy. 
As a matter of fact, the underlying considerations of Chinese authorities 
can hardly be uncovered. However, more or less, the united front strategy can 
be thought to be traced back to Mao's traditional teaching. The basic principles 
are "to unite the majority and isolate the minority", "to make use of 
contradictions and gain over independently" and the like. During the September 
of 1990，the Hong Kong-Macau Affairs Meeting held in Peking were reported 
to take this issues as one main focus. Basically, political organizations in Hong 
Kong were classified into categories and treated in different modes. Concerning 
the liberals, some of the conclusions revealed from pro-China sources reads, ' �� 
"The 'liberals，in Hong Kong should not be 
considered as totality...., even some had done wrong 
during the，June-fourth incident，，if they can then 
realize the true condition, willing to，turn direction，， 
the officials should take an active role 'to pave for 
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them，. It was predicted by the Chinese leaders that 
the l^iberals，will soon be fragmented openly, and 
the "radical，elements cannot maintain for long..."15. 
Moreover, another policy paper being "discovered" further stresses on the 
need of developing personnel programs in Hong Kong16. Communist members 
will be absorbed from various strata and social organizations and the activities 
of the sub-division of Communist Party will be strengthened in Hong Kong. The 
method is "single-line linkage, personal identity confidential". As a result, the 
extent to which Communist "direct participation" oil local affairs and her 
penetrability into the liberal organizations will remain almost unrevealed, but 
its divisive effect on the liberals can never be overlooked. 
The effectiveness of the divide and rule strategy, on a whole, still needs 
further qualifications. First of all, the level of institutionalization of the parties 
will probably be an important intervening factor17. The more the cohesive and 
free from personal domination the party is, the more stable the party policy and 
leadership is, and the less will be the capability for the Chinese officials to single 
out targets of co-optation and displace the party as a whole. Under the specific 
cases of MP and ADPL, though it is difficult to evaluate the degree of the 
relative effects, the less cohesive core as well as personal dominated nature of 
ADPL will be a condition more easily subjected to the influences of such 
strategy. 
Second, concerning the external environment, suppose if China-Hong 
Kong conflict continues to have its significance especially when China's 
increasing intervention in local affairs induces new disputes and mass grievances, 
the gap between the liberals, whose power base on the mass aspirations, and 
China will remain apparent and compromises will be difficult to achieve. Any 
peculiar moves towards China will easily raise public skepticism and unavoidably 
face severe condemnations. Recent debates on the Court of Final Appeal 
constitution and the committee system of Legco can illustrate this fact. 
Third and finally, China-Hong Kong relations is still ultimately 
deadlocked on the June-fourth incident. Though mass sentiments may not be 
constantly upheld, it will after all be extremely difficult for the liberals to shift 
their positions. As a result, the contradictions cannot be totally resolved unless 
the hardline leaders of PRC can subsequently be replaced18. 
Under such conceptions, the relationships of MP and ADPL specifically 
with UDHK can partially be summarized. Not long after June-fourth incident, 
the practical considerations on the problems of political transition raised the 
controversial issue of resuming dialogue with the Chinese officials. Though 
UDHK during its formation also faced the same dilemma, China's deliberate 
isolation had turned the situation into particularly sensitive. Even MP and 
ADPL as first employed cautious steps and moderated from total insulation with 
China slowly and incrementally, signs of "turn direction" became susceptible to 
the alert UDHK leaders and over-reactions became more easily anticipated. 
Specifically, the adoptation of Law Cheung-Kwok as the Legco candidate by 
ADPL in mid-1990 finally induced harsh responses from UDHK and the step 
was being accused as "pro-China" and "betrayal of the cause"19. Although it can 
never be told whether China was playing an active role in the incident, her 
pressure from behind had doubtlessly stimulated the clash in an indirect manner. 
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If China factor is latent in the above case, the intentions of her recent 
moves are far more apparent and straight-forward. The director of Hong Kong 
and Macau Affair Office, Lu Ping, during his visit to Hong Kong in late 1991， 
officially met leaders of MP and ADPL for the first time after the 1989 events 
and publicly rejected the request of UDHK. In this case, MP, which is for long 
been identified as maintaining closest relations with Chinese officials, however, 
adopts a much lower profile. This probably enables MP to preserve its close 
communication and connection with UDHK. Shortly afterwards, the first group 
of Advisors on Hong Kong affairs were appointed. Though without 
representatives of liberals in meanwhile, the messages of possibility for 
appointing chairmen of MP and ADPL into the second group, which still in its 
early preparatory stage, are publicized through various channels20. Future 
developments are, of course, remained to be seen, but irresistibly China's 
strengthening efforts and pressures will increasingly be felt by the liberals over 
time. 
Colonial cooptation 
Besides the Chinese government, the colonial authorities, being 
responsible for governing till 1997，also preserve essential capacities to allocate 
political resources among the political elites. Particularly, she can selectively 
disclose information, adopt the opinion of particular political forces or even 
appointing them into various public offices. Notably, a number of para-
administrative organizations were set up in mid and late 1980's which can 
partially serve as new channels of planting political aspirants as well as balancing 
the influences of major representative bodies with increasing elected 
compositions (Lau, 1988). The "leadership policy" and subsequent effects, as 
revealed underneath, tend to display some structural similarities to that of 
China. 
Historically, divide and rule or the use of selective incentives has for long 
been practiced by the colonial administration in dealing with the indigenous 
leaders. During the course of political transition, however, the ability to maintain 
her authoritative position is greatly undermined and even the loyalty of the 
traditional collaborators is being shaken (Lau, 1987). Resistance from China 
implies large scale power delegation through popular elections as a means to re-
strengthen the governing machine becomes impossible. Without many choices, 
the British have to make use of every elements that can be exploited of. 
The liberals have originally emerged as a critical and anti-establishment 
political force. Their "conflictual" and uncompromising instinct made them a 
long term headache for the administration. However, as Lau (1990a) points out, 
"at times Britain finds them politically useful as a means to counter the 
intentions and actions by China. Sometimes they-are useful as an ally of the 
colonial government when it intends to adopt policies which are opposed by 
vested interests in Hong Kong or by China." (p.24) The double-faced disruption 
and cooptive strategy of the British thus becomes another important source 
affecting political tendencies and mutual orientations among the liberals. 
Before the recomposition of the liberal force during the 1990，s and their 
landslide in 1991 direct elections, their substantial influences were relatively 
small and largely remained outside formal political institutions. They were, 
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however, already signs of increasing cooptations from the government during the 
late 1980，s corresponding to the gradual growth of the force, though within a 
small scale (Cheng, 1989a). For instance, Martin Lee was appointed as the head 
of Consumer Council and Fung King-kei the member of Housing Authority, for 
which both bodies have substantial decision-making power21. Senior members of 
MP were also appointed as part time consultants of the Central Policy Unit 
directly under the Governor and the Chief Secretary, as well as to a number of 
advisory committees. 
It is, nevertheless, after the 1991 Legco direct election that such issue 
becomes widely attentive. Specifically, immediate after the victory, newly elected 
Legco members of UDHK were "invited" by the Governor to have a meeting 
which eventually caused territorial wide controversies. During the meeting, the 
members were "asked to offer" a "name-list" for Legco appointed member 
nominations. Discussions also concerned the possibilities of appointing their 
representative(s) to the Exco, which is effectively the central decision making 
body of the government. Such incident created emotional responses from the 
public and the moves were criticized as "undemocratic" and "power hungry". 
Their high profile was labelled as boastful and over self-esteem. At the same 
time, MP, with two Legco members returned then, also showed willingness to 
accept appointments into Exco if being offered. Such steps consequently caused 
reactions of ADPL, being a loser of the same election, to sign an announcement 
together with a number of small organizations of "feeling extremely angry and 
sorry" about the moves22. 
Though the terms offered by UDHK were still turned down in result, the 
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possibilities of extended absorption from the colonial government have never 
been ruled out. Some examples include the appointments of representatives 
from the three liberal parties into the New Airport Consultative Committee, 
though the latter turns out to have little statutory power. Most significantly, due 
to the planned replacement of the Governor in the middle of the year, the 
feasibility of appointing UDHK representatives into Exco is again raised onto 
the public agenda. Recent high profile meeting between Martin Lee and Yeung 
Sum, being chairman and vice-chairman of UDHIC, with Prime Minister John 
Major again gives strong signals of the fixture collaboration of British with these 
liberal leaders. 
Overall speaking, the cooptive strategy of the British and possible 
consequences still require further interpretations. Fundamentally, she can benefit 
from such process in two major senses. On one hand, the liberals, as revealed, 
can be used to encounter the influences of China and local vested interests. On 
the other hand, however, the influences of the liberals themselves also have to 
be restricted through divide and rule. These contrast with China's strategy 
significantly for the latter seems to have relatively little need to "rely" on the 
liberals. The double-edged nature of the British intentions makes her at one 
time place UDHK in prestige position especially facing constitutional affairs and 
Sino-British relationships but at other times trying to incorporate other 
organizations to isolate UDHK especially during policy debates. Such gestures 
tend to promote internal competition among the liberals23 but the potential 
divisive effects, comparing to China's style, are still by and large the same. 
The critical point, whether Martin Lee can earn a seat in Exco, remains 
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to be seen. Still, the effects can roughly be evaluated in advance. Basically, the 
step symbolizes a manifest shift from the oppositional role into a member of the 
ruling bloc. The adverse positions of "insiders" and "outsiders' among liberals can 
probably become an inducement of mutual hostility. However, these need not 
necessarily come true for the surrender of mass partyline and militant image 
denote a fundamental transformation which seems to be too costly for UDHK24. 
Consequently, the focal point rests upon the possibility of loosening the 
principles of confidentiality and collective responsibility as traditional practices 
of Exco. If the answer is positive, UDHK's entrance into Exco merely denotes 
a shift of the arena for political disputes onto the upper level, no substantial 
alternation in the organization's identity and status will thus be made. The 
implication, then, will become whether the minor parties being excluded from 
Exco, assumingly MP and ADPL, will further be overshadowed and their 
political relevance being deprived/ Pressure to compete for survival niches, in 
this case, will probably tend to be condensed. 
Ultimately, however, the extent to which government is capable of 
coopting the liberals, in general, still depends on the intensity of government-
people conflict. The liberals, whose support lies particular in the middle-lower 
class, will be increasingly alienated from the authorities with the worsening of 
the economic conditions and intensifying of livelihood problems. Political 
radicalization and dichotomization will thus be enhanced and the liberals can 
have little choice but perform absolute oppositional roles. The requirement of 
cooperation among the liberals in facing the common threat, then, will also be 
promoted. 
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Opponent political forces 
If the relations between the liberals and the authorities are rather 
ambiguous, their break with opponent political forces are more obvious. 
Fundamentally various political forces have to engage in life and death struggle 
for minute power components squeezed out of the limited institutional settings. 
They are more or less located in a zero-sum or pure-conflictual condition. While 
political organizations and the government can to some extent be mutually 
useful, the potential of exchanges among rival political forces is much little. This, 
however, far from implying that political forces will thus be internally united in 
order to combat the opponents. 
Basically, the problems involved can by and large be conceptually 
bisected into electoral and non-electoral situations. During the remarkable 1991 
Legco direct election, intense encounter between rival political forces were 
seldom observed, Pro-China and conservative forces were generally considered 
to be under-prepared which probably reflects their variations in opportunity 
structures. At most, liberals were notably encountered by isolated pro-China 
candidates in some constituencies. Overall speaking, the conservative force, 
mainly represented by LDF, were weak and constituted no substantial threats. 
In areas in which the liberals have long experiences of local political 
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participation, particularly, the inertia is even weaker. 
Under such circumstances, logically, the need for liberals to pool 
resources and defence from common enemies were lowered, and slack resources 
were available to start in-door fights. The lack of strong opponents, peculiarly, 
aroused the power initiatives and perceptions of wide ascending opportunities 
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among liberals, especially of those who were election oriented and being 
optimistic to mass support. Internal conflicts were as a result induced. Under the 
same logic, future electoral alliance among the liberals will also depend on 
whether strong opponent parties can be developed in the next few years. The 
success of liberals in 1991, however, has already become a strong stimuli for the 
development of counter balancing forces (see Zald and Useem, 1987). 
Though such conception seems to be commonsensual, they can still be 
partially supported by the work of Zald and McCarthy (1980)，"The more the 
clear-cut and vigorous the counter-movement, the easier it is to mobilize an 
alliance." (H13)25 In the above case, the liberals faced opponents neither with 
clear-cut nor united images, nor with potentially "vigorous" threats. The contrast 
between MP and ADPL, furthermore, can systematically be compared. 
Empirically, although both parties nominated three candidates26, the 
attempts of ADPL was generally considered as more ambitious for, on one hand, 
it tended to be monopolizing both seats in Kowloon West, on the other hand, 
it stepped into NT North which had already two liberal candidates from MP and 
UDHK. On the contrary, MP took a much low profile and merely stressed on 
the goal "to break through from zero-seat in Legco". 
Underlying such phenomenon, some implications can be revealed. On one 
hand, MP and ADPL contrast in basic organizational characteristics. Although 
MP has a longer history, its commitment to electoral participation is partial and 
its image as a commentary group is even greater27. Though it is the foremost to 
develop its local branches, the scale is either limited, or the main activists have 
already transferred to UDHK. Contrarily, ADPL is more locally based and 
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election oriented. 
On the other hand, ADPL adopts a more rapid momentum i 
transforming itself into a party. In fact, referring back to its foundation, the 
attempt to become the first party in Hong Kong was already apparent. It is 
therefore not surprising to find ADPL having greater initiative in the power 
game. While for MP, its "intellectual" background has always puzzled itself with 
uncertainty in organizational identity. This was especially true when many 
"actionists" in elections of MP had left for UDHK and its future status needed 
redefinition (Shum, 1991). It is not until the 1991 election victory that the 
morale of the organization is boosted and determination is made to evolve as 
a party. (Again, the effects of lack opponents to stimulate power imtmti^ is 
demonstrated thoroughly)28. 
If the electoral arena seems to be monopolized by the liberals, in the case 
of non-electoral situations, the scenario is much different. Whether within or 
outside political institutions, the chance of the liberals, due to their peripheral 
and oppositional positions, to exert solidary influences on public policies and 
obtain concrete results is minimal. Such constant Don Quixote role, however, 
provides much less inducement for the liberals to collude even when they face 
the strong alliance of colonial government and conservative forces. This is 
especially true even after the emergence of CRC. The new "strong opponent" 
and its encounter with UDHK not only unable to stimulate MP and ADPL to 
stand firmly on the side of UDHK, but even exert pressure on these two minor 
parties to single out and differentiate themselves in the Legco dominated by and 
polarized between the two major parties29. 
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The views and votes of the liberals are still by and large coherent, but 
these can hardly imply any stable collective effort. A notable step was a joint 
letter written in May, 1992 to the Prime Minister urging for further political 
reform, being signed by 17 out of 18 direct elected Legco members (the new 
Big-three members plus independent liberal Emily Lau), seems to symbolize 
some cooperation among them, but this has rarely occurred. Basically, the logic 
of strong opponent induces alliance does not in general apply, probably for, on 
one hand, parliamentary confrontation does not imply real threat to existence, 
on the other hand, even when an alliance is formed, the chance of victory is still 
minimal. 
On the whole, how can the roles of authorities and opponent political 
forces in shaping the inter-organizational relationships of the liberal parties be 
evaluated? Undoubtedly, the divisive effects of cooptation from authorities, as 
the ultimate sources of power allocation, are more fundamental and substantial. 
Overt consequences cannot, however, be clearly identified. This may partially 
due to the uncovered nature of the political reality and partially because the 
effects are long term and overwhelming rather than exposed on specific events. 
Ultimately, the remain-to-be strengthened efforts of the authorities have yet 
seemed to be leastly felt by the liberals. 
3. Inter-organizational linkages 
Linkages among political organizations here specifically denote informal 
personal ties or power networks among organizations. More concretely, 
interlocking directorship and multiple membership are two explicit forms. 
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Intuitively, "linkages" caii easily be misunderstood to be identical with "closeness" 
or "friendliness", or "link with" already implies "cooperate with". In reality, this 
is far from necessary be true and will be demonstrated throughout the 
discussion. 
Apparently, for Zald and McCarthy (1980), the common sensual view is 
directly adopted, 
"The more the interlocks, the greater the 
cooperation among SMOs." (H9, p. 12) 
"The more SMOs have overlapping 
constituencies [i.e. membership], the more they 
should constrained toward cooperation." (H10, p. 13) 
The assumption they hold is simple: more link, more communication and 
less isolation, thus better chance to cooperate. These obviously need not be 
wrong. Such view, it wiH： however be asserted here, constitutes to one of the 
major drawbacks of their theory. Basically，it only recognize the constructive but 
not the destructive face of inter-organizational linkages. The latter effect, being 
also a common phenomenon, have be sufficiently worked on by other 
contributors30. For instance, as Staggenborg (1986) states "...there is often a fear 
of，take-over，of the coalition by one or more powerful organizations or factions. 
This tension arises as the coalition attempts to establish its own identity，while 
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organizations within the coalition seek to maintain their own visibility." (p.384) 
Again, as Panebianco (1988) also states, "In summary, a party's stability depends 
on its ability to defend its own identity. Identity is, however, threatened by the 
existence of competitors; and it is even more endangered if an alliance is made 
with them (both emphasis added)/ (p.281) 
What worth stress is the insights under such conceptions, that 
preservation of one's own identity is essential to organization maintenance and 
4 it will likely be jeopardized by the connections with similar organizations. This 
is particularly true if the problems of loyalty and commitment among the 
members as well as internal considerations on organizational "domain" or goal 
definition are concerned. Such issues are even more primary for political 
organizations and constitutive to interorganizational disputes than the 
competition for resources and audiences3气 Wilson (1973) provides a general 
framework for these subtle threads of consideration, 
"Associations, seeking to maintain 
themselves, are highly averse to risk and thus to 
active rivalry except under special circumstances. 
The easiest and most prudent maintenance strategy 
is to develop autonomy- that is, a distinctive area of 
* 
competence, a clearly demarcated and exclusively 
served clientele or membership, and undisputed 
jurisdiction over a function, service, goal or cause." 
(p.263) 
"In sum, voluntary associations not in 
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opposition to one another are more likely to be 
competitive than when autonomy is low than when 
resources are wanting. The struggle to create a 
distinctive identity and competence, an assured 
domain, seems to be the first prerequisite for 
maintenance; given such autonomy, aspirations will 
tend to correspond to available resources... An 
association lacking in autonomy and resources will 
denote more attention to establishing a domain 
than to raising a large budget (emphasis added)." 
(p.266) 
Such conceptualizations, however, still need further qualifications. As 
Panebianco (1988) maintains, "...The level of institutionalization of allied 
competitive parties is ail important intervening variable. A strongly 
institutionalized party can defend its stability better than a weak one despite an 
alliance with a competitor (emphasis added)." (p.219) But at the same time, 
stable relationships can also be maintained when one party is too weak and 
uninstitutionalized such that environmental hostility even promotes rather than 
undermines internal stability (p.218). As a result, a curvilinear relationship 
between level of institutionalization and stability of organizational identity, i.e. 
the release from fear of being "take-over", can be tentatively derived (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10 
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Level of I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n 
Multiple membership 
Under the specific context of Hong Kong, political organizations are 
empirically characterized by the predominance of multiple membership. The 
phenomenon and negative organizational consequences is pointed out early by 
Professor Lau Siu-kai as following (1985), 
"It will not be uncommon for an aspirant to belong 
to several groups at the same time in order to 
maximize his political opportunities, thus 
minimizing his loyalty and commitments to any one 
of them. In any case, it would be difficult for any 
political group to retain a large pool of political 
talents to broaden group appeal and consolidate 
‘ . 1 0 7 . 
group power. Consequently, the number of 
contending political groups will stay large whilst the 
size of these groups will remain minuscule." (p.28-
29) 
Several points worth emphasis here. First of all, organizational under-
development is not only constituted by, but also responsibly constitutive to the 
prevalence of multiple membership. Structurally weak organizations, being 
loosely cohered and unable to exert effective central control, tend to tolerate the 
continuity of interlocks and overlapping membership. Second, the interweaving 
and crosscutting networks of personnel are further complicated not only by the 
common social origins and pre-existing ties of the activists, but also by the 
continual decomposition and recomposition of political organizations during the 
prolonged transitional period. Whenever new organizations are set up, new 
bonds are created but old bonds may still be preserved and multiplies in 
breadth. Third, under rapid socio-political change and organizational evolvement 
in 1990's, the scale and formality of political organizations, notably new bred 
parties, have largely raised32. The need to strengthen organizational discipline 
is also enhanced. Multiple membership, though still remains, its relevance and 
impact particularly on interorganizational relationships is greatly reduced. 
� . 
Overall speaking, the empirical trends for overlaps among political parties 
are gradually declining. Both MP and ADPL report to have less than 20 out of 
200 and 150 members respectively enjoying also the membership of UDHK33. 
Originally, the practice of allowing dual membership can be seen as a historical 
compromise which represented support for the formation of a major liberal 
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party but at the same time preserved the original "Big-three" as minor 
organizations. For MP and ADPL alike, a further restriction was later made to 
inhibit their candidates in elections for public offices to possess dual 
membership. For ADPL, with MP will soon follow, central committee members 
are also under such restriction. Therefore, virtually only ordinary and non-core 
members of the two parties can maintain the overlapping status and in fact, from 
the early beginning, major leaders have already in practice chosen to be active 
in only one among the parties, which again demonstrates the objective need for 
developing organizational loyalty. 
The remained overlapping membership can still to some extent 
contributes to interorganizational communications. On one hand, messages and 
opinion can more effectively be transferred through personal network especially 
on sensitive issues. On the other hand, attitudes of one party on another may 
also be moderated with the presence of such intermediaries. Potential conflicts 
and competition can be alarmed and prevented at early stage. The performance 
of such function, however, still depends on some more subtle interpersonal 
relationships discussed below. 
On the contrary, the problems concerning identity and autonomy are not 
significantly observed among the parties. For either MP and ADPL, overlaps 
with UDHK gradually become symbolic in nature and the loyalty issue ceases 
to be a serious problem. More fundamentally, with the overall growing rate of 
consolidation among the parties, members，commitment tends to be 
incrementally stabilized and organizational identity has already been established. 
The possibility of and uncertainty created by "take over" from others has to been 
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fading out of concern. This probably contrasts sharply to formation period of 
UDHK, in which the pressure to conglomerate had induced much skeptism and 
disputes (Chapter II). However, it should still be added, the internal cohesion 
of ADPL (and also UDHK) is still potentially problematic especially due to the 
predominance of political leaders with concrete local power bases. The relative 
"attractiveness" of and possible absorption from other parties will tend to 
reincrease again if significant internal crisis is encountered, although it will be 
here extremely difficult to predict the details. 
Interpersonal cleavages 
Linkages, besides positive bonds or ties, can also be negative and hostile 
interpersonal relations. The origins of such hostilities can of course be diverse, 
but in the examined cases electoral competition and intra-organizational power 
struggle seems to be common forms. In brief, the pre-existence of cleavages at 
personal level among organizations, though does not harm but may even 
promote organizational autonomy and identity, can still be intensified and 
eventually catalyst inter-organizational conflicts. 
Organizational split is the possible process involved. For Zald and 
McCarthy (1980)，"Interorganizational relations may emerge from intra- , 
organizational factionalism. Especially in social movements, factoralism may lead 
to splits and the formation of new organizations." (p.17) As consequence, "after-
split conflicts" are likely to be anticipated. In case of the formation of UDHK, 
the decisions on the transfer of leaders from MP and ADPL involved internal 
debates in the two parties. Eventually, some choose to leave and some stay. 
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These can undoubtedly be considered as a form of organizational split, although 
the hostility and mistrust concerned may greatly vary. 
For instance, the interpersonal relations among former colleagues of MP 
seem to be better preserved. While in the case of ADPL, the disagreement 
between chairman Fung Kin-kei and former vice-chairman Lee Wing-tat, which 
has switched to UDHK, is rather apparent. Another former senior member of 
ADPL, Chan Wai-Yip, has even showed dissatisfactions on Fung openly and 
resigned from the party as soon as stepping to UDHK. Although it will be 
impossible to evaluate to what extent UDHK，s orientation towards ADPL is 
under their influences, what is certain is the buffer effect can virtually be non-
existent. 
Conflicts can also arise from previous electoral clashes. Competition 
within the liberals at local level elections during the past decade were 
enormously reported. Such cleavages have naturally be brought into the 
organizational context as these locally based leaders gradually occupy major 
positions in the parties. The cases are so plentiful and apparent that examples 
will not be offered. 
To further supplement, the extent of influence on inter-organizational 
relationships resulted from personal origins is also affected by the level of 
institutionalization among the parties. The less the formality and more the 
personal domination, the greater the possibility will be such split-over effect. The 
personal antagonism between Fung Kin-kei and some major figures of UDHK, 
again for instance, due to his central and pivotal positions in ADPL, has 
unavoidably thrown shadows on the relationship between the two parties. 
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4. Problems of Mobilization 
Again consider two events. 
In 1987 and 88，the campaigns for 1988 direct election and a more 
democratic Basic Law were launched by the liberals under the common flag of 
JCPDG. Internal consensus on goals and strategies could by and large be 
maintained. Mass movements, in forms of protest, petitions, signature campaigns 
etc., though could not arouse much mass support, still proceeded over a long • 
period and raised much attention. 
In 1991，in the Legco direct election, some original colleagues in JCPDG 
became rivalries under flags of different parties. Though received general public 
support even greater than expected, internal conflicts among the liberals became 
made known and intensified. The original extra-institutional, anti-establishment 
activists had then devoted to the internal competition for institutional power. 
Undoubtedly, the significantly altering political circumstances have 
offered the liberals completely different opportunities and constraints. Within 
three or four years, they have evolved from a relative weak oppositional 
movement to a major political participatory force, though the process is 
continuous and a number of problems are still disturbing them. What further 
can be revealed in such process of transformation? 
First, of course, the former case was a campaign for "the rules of the 
game" and debate on "political ideals", while the latter already concerned 
"playing the game" and competition for concrete power allocation. Second, the 
former was an bottom-up extra-institutional mass movement while the latter an 
electoral mobilization under the top-down institutional setting. Third, the target 
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group of support the former oriented was the general public while for the latter 
became more concrete individual voters. In either case, however, mass media 
was still an important means of promoting influence. 
In both of the events, nevertheless, the phenomenon involved can 
identically be indicated as a mobilization process. Mobilization can be defined 
as "the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources 
needed by collective action." (Jenkins, 1983) Though mobilizations vary greatly 
in context and content, some basic features can still be distinguished. 
Fundamentally, the goal of mobilization is power and influences34. Conceptually, 
the targets and tactics of mobilizations will probably be two major aspects of 
concern in the above contrasting cases. The first denotes what kind of resources 
is needed or more substantially, who will be the resources extracted from? While 
the second denotes how will be the resources gathered and manipulated? 
"Resources" is doubtlessly the core concept of RMT, but its vagueness 
and unspecificity has caused much controversies35. In this study, three dimensions 
will specifically be dealt with independently: supporters (ranging from opinion 
expression, labour devotion and vote), mass media and money. While the first 
can be considered as the ultimate concern of mass-based parties, the latter two 
are also essential for maintaining organizational activities or as means of 
reaching the supporters. 
How will the resources be collected and applied, or the "tactical concern" 
of SMOs is another important aspect of mobilization. Logically, under diversified 
contexts and external conditions, tactical calculations are vastly different as 
revealed simplisticly in the above cases. Again, electoral and non-electoral 
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situations will roughly be distinguished as two major dimensions involving 
various strategies in the following discussion. Their implication on inter-
organizational relationships will respectively be revealed. 
Analytically, if the last section focuses on the problems of identity and 
autonomy, the present will be on resources and audiences of any political 
organizations. A further comparison between them is note-worthy. Basically, the 
former is basically concerning the internal environment, be it involving 
leadership interrelations or leader-member relations, problems of cohesion or 
problems of commitments. While for the latter, the stress is placed on the 
external environment, be it htiman or material resources, tangible or intangible, 
all are available from the large society outside the organization setting 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977). For Wilson (1973)，obviously, the former are more 
fundamental and essential problems for organizations survival than the latter. 
If one's defining character is qualitative and discrete, another is quantitative, 
only a matter of more or less. 
Most importantly, they tend to display different properties under different 
context-specific situations. Concerning inter-organizational linkages, the potential 
risks on identity conservation are nearly unavoidable; but they may at the same 
time raise rather than lower the resource level of the same organization36. The 
relation between linkages and resources is thus far more contingent. On the 
contrary, concerning problems of mobilization, the scarcity of resources is a basic 
inducement for competition among political organizations. However, although 
some minimal level of resource is necessary for basic organizational survival, the 
lack of resources does not affect the preservation of organizational autonomy or 
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identity. Intensive resource competition may, to some extent, even promote 
internal integrity and common identity. 
How, ultimately, does the problems of mobilization affect inter-
organizational relationships? Wilson (1973) provides a simple and direct answer, 
"Associations that oppose one another typically do 
not compete with one another...The anti-competitive 
or compatibility theory, if correct in predicting that 
coalitions will form along the lines of least 
resistance, also suggests that potential members who 
• find similarity "threatening will not join, or if they 
. ...厶’ 
join, will soon resign...The more alike two 
organizations are, the greater the likelihood they lay 
claim to identical causes, attempt to serve the same 
constituency or compete for the same resources." 
(p.263 & 212� 
, To put it even more simply, similarity leads to competition, which forms 
the basic proposition throughout this section. Further specifications are, 
however, contributed by Zald and McCarthy (1980) under the same logic. First 
of all, knowledge about the preconditions of general resource level in the society 
is essential." Under conditions of declining availability of marginal resources, 
direct competition and conflict between SMOs with similar goals can be 
expected to increase." (HI, p.5) 
Second, similarities in targets but contradictions in tactics farther deepen 
the conflict. "Assuming that SMOs are competing for similar audiences, as SMOs 
within an industry become farther apart in their conceptions of the amount 
change and the tactics required, rancorous conflict increases." (H5, p.9) 
Third and contrarily, certain extent of dissimilarity may lead to 
cooperation. "Domain agreements are more likely to be revealed allowing 
extended cooperation among SMOs with different but not contradictory task 
specializations...(emphasis added)" (H7, p. 11) Such agreements may take 
geographical or functional forms so that overlaps in targets can be minimized 
and mutual support facilitated. To a lesser extent, even if the same constituents 
are mobilized, product differentiation can still effectively reduce the intensity 
of competition and the scenario turned into a non-zero sum condition. 
Ultimately, "since no organizations commands the total loyalty of most of its 
constituents…Once a person give funds, future solicitations from other SMOs 
become more likely." (ibid., p.6) 
On the whole, as pointed out throughout the study, the inability to 
generate strong mass support is a fundamental problem of the liberals. The 
poorly organized and political apathetic mass provides limited support to the 
aspirant liberals. Poverty of ideological content and lack of deep-rooted social 
cleavages makes mass mobilization, which the liberals rely on, a throat-cutting 
competition among themselves. The scenario, should of course, be also 
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understood from the political-institutional context. The institutional limits to 
political ascending not only significantly hamper mass political aspirations and 
stimulate sense of political inefficacy, but also force among the contenders a 
concentration of efforts on narrow electoral channels, ultimately inducing the 
tension of resources. 
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Several niches, however, can still be found in such general pessimistic 
picture. First, with the gradual politicization of the society facing 1997, especially 
under the impact of June-fourth incident, the scope of public support received 
by the liberals is to a certain extent raised. Second, the relative poverty of other 
political forces at grassroot support consolidation, though induces internal 
competition, still enables the liberals to dominate a large portion of the extra-
institutional political sphere. 
Third, the general increases in affluence level, though need not directly 
provide politicized effects, still likely create a relative amount of discretionary 
resources in the whole society, which may potentially be exploited by the 
political organizations. For instance, many people may join rallies due to the 
plentiful of leisure time. However, possible future economic hardship will also 
produce opposite effects. 
Finally, the well-developed mass communication system and high standard 
of education in the territory enables propaganda works to be facilitated. The 
ease access and effectiveness of direct mobilization lowers the need for time-
consuming and labour-intensive operations. But again, the over-reliance on mass 
media has also created another arena of competition to be discussed below. 
What, then, are the more specific and concrete situations under which 
competition and conflict (or cooperation) among the parties becomes likely, 
particularly in the context of late transitional Hong Kong? 
Electoral mobilization 
Assume this was the case. 
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The number of direct elected seats in Legco was 10 rather than 18 in 
1991，as prompted in the 1988 White Paper on Political Reform, while the 
geographically based constituencies were by and large preserved. What would 
happen to the power dynamics in the same election? 
Apparently, that will imply at least 6 out of the 16 elected candidates 
coming from the new "Big-three" will be excluded from their present Legco 
positions. Provided that there would also be no alternative channels available, 
would they easily satisfied to be dismissed? Could compromises in the 
nomination process be equally likely to be achieved? 
The speculated answers to the above questions will probably be negative. 
The predominance of power aspirants when contrasts to the limited amount of 
power open for competition forms the basic features of the power grasping 
game. The emergence of such phenomenon can be traced back to a number of 
factors. As discussed before, first, the low-cost entry and top-down political 
reform provides direct and illusory wide open channels especially during the 
early stage of transition. Second, while true amateurs are likely to turnover and 
fade out, leaders experiencing success in commanding public support through 
elections or mass movements are more likely to stay and multiply in number. 
Third and relatedly，a major factor not mentioned before is the logic of 
" V 
political reform. Starting from early 1980's, the government has paid much effort 
in developing district administration. Though with little or no statutory power, 
the locally based representative bodies including DB and UC/RC have in effect 
provide many open channels of electoral participation over an enduring period. 
These, on one hand, provide favourable conditions for the political aspirants to 
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practice political skills and gradually develop their popularity and mass appeals. 
On the other hand, the largely consultative nature of bodies requires no political 
responsibility and provides no incentive for the activists to form close alliances 
with each other. They can be perceived as merely arenas of useless debates and 
freely criticizing government. As a result, a number of power potential leaders 
predominating at the local level is brought up. Internal competitions and 
fragmentation are also likely to be encouraged (Chow, 1990). 
The impacts of these leaders on party development are also enormous. 
The distinctive, consolidated local bases they possess can greatly undermine the 
internal cohesion of parties (Panebianco, 1988). The centrifugal tendencies, 
localistic orientations and lack of cross-district mutual support are common 
features, especially experienced by ADPL (and UDHK) which hamper the 
development of organizational discipline and concentration of resources. Parties, 
as a result, often find it difficult to exert effective control and regulations on 
these aspirants. 
The over-development of local political leaders is, furthermore, inducive 
to competition among themselves due to their geographical concentrations37. 
Power clashes among liberals were reported in NT East, West, North and South, 
as well as Kowloon West constituencies in the 1991 election38. All these areas 
are which the liberals have been active over a long period, developed extensive 
local connections and good foundations. For a further glance, the areas 
concerned in fact possess strikingly similarities in demographic characteristics. 
They can be known as (or at least part of them as) the public housing belt in 
which middle-lower class residents concentrated. In especially the new towns, 
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usually live younger, smaller families, chains of daily livelihood problems are 
often encountered and traditional political forces are either absent or fading, 
providing favourable breeding grounds for the liberal political activists who 
employ new mobilizing strategies and electoral images (Lee, 1989, Chow, 1990). 
On the contrary, in more middle class based residential areas on Hong Kong 
Island, as well as local pro-China forces preoccupied, early developed areas, like 
Kowloon East and Central39, liberals are much less proliferated, which can also 
partially account for the lack of internal competitions among them in these 
areas. 
Consequently, electoral competition and organizational confrontation 
among liberal parties can likely be anticipated. Primarily, their over-reliance on 
the limited electoral channels as well as the similarity of supporters they 
command votes from creates general conditions of tension. More specifically, 
their inability to exert top-down control over the locally based leaders implies 
that during the nomination process central coordination and higher level 
compromise becomes virtually impossible and parties are actually "led by" the 
inclinations of individual aspirants. The pressure of competition further induces 
some of the candidates to adopt more radical stands and severe verbal attacks 
over each other, in order to differentiate themselves and single out their own 
images, thus intensifying the conflict. 
Again, the empirical variations of MP and ADPL can be sharply 
contrasted. The decentralized and personal dominated property of ADPL was 
clearly demonstrated in the 1991 election. In planting its candidates, the 
considerations based on localistic concern and calculation were rather apparent. 
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Besides the inheritly localistic leaders, in the case of Law Cheung-kwok, though 
he did not have any experiences in local public service, his nomination in fact 
still reflected the over-concentration and over-confidence of ADPL leaders on 
their support in Sum Shui Po district40. On one hand, the lack of geographical 
extension made them felt the need to further seclude its local foundation. On 
the other hand, their originally stable mass base and predomination in that area 
aroused the initiatives to monopolize both seats41. Even in the case of Chow 
Mei-tat, who also did not have any local connections and long-term planning in 
NT North, ADPL still nominated him. It revealed the important fact that the 
party did not possess an overall strategy but relied on the candidate's own 
discretion and personal initiative. Both the control and support from the party 
was minimal. As a result, local power centers and individual political aspirants 
had in effect pushed the party into cross-party antagonism. 
On the contrary, MP offered a completely different picture. The 
nomination of candidates was essentially initiated and steered by the party 
center. Although the candidates also process more or less local power bases, 
their flexibility and self-determination in the mobilization process was relatively 
little, thus enabled better central coordination and control. As a matter of fact, 
the power incentives of both the party and the candidates were relatively lower 
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and much open space for consultation and negotiation with other parties were 
preserved. Possible confrontations could thus be systematically avoided. 
At the same time, the high profile and ambitious participation of ADPL 
in that election also reflected its election oriented character. Starting from 
organizational formation, though also stressed mass participation and extra-
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institutional channels of political articulation, its major task was still 
participating in the local level elections and almost all the core leaders were 
public office holders. Moreover, the financial support of ADPL relied on 
revenue returned from the submissions of these office holders. Their need to 
occupy more seats in political institutions can thus be understood. 
Contrarily, MP again, had for long maintained the image as a 
commentary group. Even after the readjustment of their directions in 1990's, 
diversification of resources to "multiple means of influences" is still 
emphasized42. Although it will be too early to evaluate the effectiveness of such 
strategy, what seems certain is electoral participation only constitutes part of the 
party's activities. 
However, it should again be further added, the success in 1991 election 
has substantially boosted the confidence and incentive for MP to extend its 
electoral role. According to their chairman's words, they will attempt to 
strengthen their activities at local level to occupy six seats in 1995 Legco direct 
election. Power clashes with incumbent UDHK members can then be less easily 
avoided, provided that the institutional setting is more or less unchanged. 
Issue articulation, 
Outside the electoral arena, during normal period the need to articulate 
issues, exert influence on government policies and raise public attention is also 
essential and inducive to possible competition for audiences. Although in the 
former case, the target group is concrete voters while then will be more abstract 
public support or mass following, which in general is more difficult to quantify. 
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Also, electoral support is basically geographically located while for issue support, 
besides events affecting the whole population, can more or less be perceived as 
functionally located. 
As a whole, liberal parties display striking similarities in target groups 
and political appeals. All of them claim to represent the interest of middle-lower 
class. Although such conception is relative vague and different meanings can be 
derived from, the parties have in effect fail to achieve any domain agreements 
among themselves. The policy areas they focus on are by and large the same and 
the reactive nature in responding to public agenda, disjunctively issues by issue, 
are altogether maintained. Concerns related to daily livelihood problems, e.g. 
public housing, education, social welfare, become the battlefield for raising their 
public support. Opposing government in short term, ad hoc manner rather than 
promoting alternative policies and substantial platforms is the common practice. 
Policy areas concerning economic affairs, industry and trade become the blind 
spot for the liberals in general. Even for constitutional affairs and issues related 
to 1997 transition, which liberals often rely on to establish their unique images, 
are merely reduced to debates like the number of elected seats in Legco or 
general attitude towards Chinese government. Many critical issues, e.g. the 
future relations between Legco and Exco or the electoral arrangements in 1995， 
have least be explored. 
Regarding the power dynamics in Legco, as mentioned before, the 
oppositional positions liberals are not only unconducive to cooperation, but even 
create pressures of competing for performance. Although there is still a general 
tendency for the liberals to preserve their "liberal" identity as a whole in order 
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to maintain mass fidelity, close collaboration have rarely taken place. The need 
to uphold images of individual organizations and promote public support has 
gradually exposed the tensions among the liberals. MP and ADPL, have in one 
occasion or another, attempted to differentiate themselves from UDHK and 
raise distinctive viewpoints. However, in the highly politicized and increasingly 
polarized arena, any such attempts will be extremely sensitive and easily cause 
extreme reactions from the public as well as UDHK. The departure with UDHK 
may also be likely to induce unnecessary labels such as "non-liberal" or 
"undemocratic". Both parties have, therefore, taken greatly cautious steps. 
On a whole, MP shows greater willingness to negotiate with the officials 
and established elites in aiming at substantial policy outputs and gradually 
transforming from pure oppositional role. While for ADPL, the pressure is even 
greater for possessing only a single Legco seat, the bargaining position is much 
weaker. In times, it is tempted to adopt more peculiar moves, e.g. Fung Kin-kei 
is labelled as "Mr. Amendment" by the media for his eagerness in amending the 
proposals of other Legco members in debates like public utilities and housing 
subsidy policies. More directly, Fling has explicitly showed his annoyance for 
being isolated and neglected in Legco, and expresses the need to refocus on 
extra-institutional means and organizing the grassroot43. 
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As a matter of fact, the poverty of liberals in political institutions has 
continual to force them to employ mass movement for improving their 
bargaining power. The task of mobilizing the volatile mass as well as a small 
number of militant activists for commitment and manual services further induce 
individual parties to offer more idealistic and radical appeals in order to 
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outshine other contenders (Lau, 1991a, Cheng, 1989a). Minor differences will be 
resorted to in order to demonstrate their own ideological purities. The need to 
approach the general public through mass media also forces the parties to 
employ more attractive and eye-catching tactics, and to rely on popular and 
outstanding political figures. 
Once more, the case of MP and ADPL can be compared. First, contrasts 
to ADPL and UDHK, MP has much less adopted modes of mass mobilizations. 
Instead, the intellectual, moderate and rational image is preferred. 
Commentaries on social issues, press conferences, seminars or forums are more 
frequently used to express their views. Certain level of "product differentiation" 
is thus achieved. Second, the target group MP aiming at, therefore, seems to be 
also slightly different from the other parties44. Although it equally emphasizes 
the interests of middle-lower class, its relatively secluded and neutral image is 
in effect more capable for attracting audiences with relatively higher status and 
educational level45. However, at the same time, whether will such relatively less 
high-profile and seemingly，deradical，style be able to extend its audiences and 
endure in attractiveness will remain doubtful, and probably again depends on 
the unpredictable sentimental changes of the mass. 
What should further be stressed is, MP is in fact adopting a two-fold mass 
strategy. On one hand, at territorial level the intellectual and middle class image 
is promoted, so that its uniqueness and distinctiveness can be preserved when 
contrast with other parties. On the other hand, at local level, a more grassroot 
or populist image is established intensively in specific districts or regions, so that 
concrete votes from lower class people can be collected. Such a self-conscious 
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breakup has not only facilitated more flexible organizational development 
strategy, but also avoid much direct confrontation with other liberal parties46. 
On the contrary, the situation of ADPL is worse. Although it continuously 
reminds the public as the genuine representative of lower class people, as the 
"grassroot democrats", in oppose to the "liberal democrats", its ability to detach 
from the shadows of UDHK is still low. Ultimately, UDHK, which originally 
attempts to include a wide range of political forces and adopt a more "cross-
class" partyline, but being dominated by some more militant and locally based 
leaders, has in effect evolved as another grassroot party. The tactics it pursuit 
or criticism on government it voices are even more radical and harsh than 
ADPL47. Its skills to arouse mass sentiments are also better. Its activities at local 
level are equally emphasized as ADPL does. 
Concerning specific issues like importation of labour, basic education 
finance and welfare expenditure, the role of ADPL is completely outweighed 
and public housing remains to be its home domain of concern, which can neither 
provides impressive performance. ADPL has, consequently, found itself under 
direct competition and image deterioration in facing UDHK. Its unfavorable 
situation is further worsened for its lack of political stars and inability to 
generate substantial policy impacts. Its political relevance, gradually being 
endangered, will unavoidably force it to adopt more bold steps to react against 
the influence of UDHK. 
Mass media and money 
Besides the possible competition for supporters and audiences, mass 
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media exposure and money resources are two other major areas single out to be 
discussed. As revealed below, both are also essential to organizational survival 
and development, but at the same time their supply is also limited. 
The interaction between mass media and parties is difficult to 
conceptualized or analyzed concretely and probably worth another full essay to 
discuss. What tries to offer here is only some threads of ideas. Kuan and Lau 
(1988) tentatively argue that media and groups may be interdependent as well 
as competing with each other, which is situationally contingent (p.31, 33). For 
the latter relation, apparently, the well-developed media system and also the 
extensive use of public opinion polls has substantially undermined the functions 
of parties (Lau, 1988). However, the structural weakness of parties and the 
poverty in grassroot organizations, in returns make them further depend on mass 
media to approach the public. The extent to which mass media can facilitate this 
job, however, remains misty. 
First of all, there is a general indifference of mass media to local politics 
even up to then. An "anomaly of separation between media and politics" which 
Kuan and Lau terms "the minimally-integrated media-political system" is 
preserved (1988，p.5). In their words, 
"The politically oriented newspapers in Hong Kong 
has pre-occupied themselves with serving their 
respective absentee masters [i.e. Peking or Taipei] 
with effecting changes in China, or with serving 
overseas Chinese communities...The less politically 
oriented newspaper, on the other hand, have 
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formed their attention on social and economic 
issues, but rarely subject them to political analysis." 
(P-4) 
Second, even in facing the countdown to 1997，the capability of media to 
meet the new political scene remains uncertain. Without the assistance of 
influential political channels or bodies, media has to pick up a more 
independent position, directly representing the "local identity" or serving as a 
means of public political expression (ibid., p.8). But to cultivate a new 
perspective or enduring belief on its own in the paradoxical and complicated 
circumstances is full of difficulties. In fact, "the newspaper did not have any clear 
political role and they tended to commercialize political events." (p.7) 
Worse still, the newspaper gradually adopted a kind of self-censorship in 
facing the increased pressure of China48. This is particularly unfavorable for the 
liberals, being oppositional to China, on the use of media. During the prolonged 
transitional period, China's united front strategy, especially directing towards 
media administrators via the local China News Agency, have gradually bred its 
results (Cheng, 1989a). The liberals, though receive sympathy from some more 
idealistic front-line reporters (Lau, 1987)，are effectively isolated and bounded 
in the mass media system. 
Last but not the least, several structural constraints are also anticipated 
(Kuan and Lau, 1988，p.13): the underdevelopment of professionalism; the profit 
motive of media owners in a highly competitive market and the perception 
about the apolitical natures of the media consumers. 
Under such general adverse conditions, the competition among the 
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parties for media exposure can thus be expected. This is especially true when the 
parties in general fail to uphold distinct public images and clear political beliefs. 
The tension to exploit media, in turn, paradoxically stimulates them to further 
resort to tactical innovations rather than focusing on ideological indepthness. 
Attention attracting and emotion arousing, fragmented and piecemeal actions, 
rather than detail and substantial policy analysis and argumentation, are 
overwhelmingly favored. 
As a result, efforts are concentrated on short-term and central level issues 
which can maximized public awareness, minor and routine tasks tend to be 
overlooked. A few political stars are depended on, and the job of recruiting new 
leaders as well as cultivating second line activists is largely neglected. In sum, 
such evidences can more or less show that, the limited channels of mass media, 
being over-extracted by the parties, have already created significant pressure of 
competition fully awared by the liberals, if they are not to be dismissed or 
forgotten for their very existences among the multiple number of political 
organizations49. 
Concerning the financial conditions of the liberal parties, money shortage 
is a long-term and well-known fact. The problems become far more acute when 
huge sums of expenditure are required in mass elections as well as maintaining 
offices and service support for public office holders being elected. The 
essentiality of money for organizational maintenance has created another 
possible source of competition. 
As a matter of fact, when comparing to the more wealthy conservatives 
and officially backup Pro-China forces, the possible source of financial support 
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for liberals is much limited. Income of the parties, in general, are mainly 
collected from membership fees, external donations as well as government 
subsidies to public office holders. In order to extend their capability of revenue 
generation especially during elections, many unexpected tactics are employed. 
UDHK, for instance, has made use of annual balls, IDD phone calls, managing 
a shop and even starting a travel agency to compensate its huge budget. 
On a whole, the possibility of extracting slack resources in a highly 
affluent society is still great, and to certain extent politicization of the population 
can provide potential pools of supply. Several basic problems still should not be 
overlooked. 
First, as discussed before, the oppositional role general public expected 
on parties is largely symbolic and expressive in nature, whether the pragmatic 
mass will further offer substantial support is doubtful. Second, the weak social 
base and organizational limitations are also reflected in the small membership 
of the parties, the largest UDHK has not more than 400 members. The sources 
from membership fee and collections through personal networks are extremely 
bounded. Third, the task is further hindered by government policies. Fund-
raising activities in Hong Kong are under strict legal control and subjected to a 
number of restrictions. As a result, more commercialized means seem to become 
氣 . 
necessary. 
When comparing the situations of MP and ADPL, again, the difficulties 
of the latter are exposed. First of all, serious financial problems arose especially 
during UDHK was formed, a significant number of ADPL public office holders 
(approximately 2/3) had shifted to the new party50. Being the major source of 
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revenue, such change was in fact a crisis for ADPL, dislike feelings were not 
surprise to be found among the remainders. MP, on the contrary, neither 
encountered such a high turnover rate nor does it rely on this as major income 
sources. 
Second and relatedly, MP is able to generate its major revenue from its 
members. The fee it demands is the highest among all parties in Hong Kong. 
The middle class and intellectual background of its members also enables them 
capable to make farther donations, especially when compared to the relatively 
younger and lower socio-economic status of ADPL members51. 
Third and finally, MiP, with its moderate and rational appeal, may even 
be able to attract the interests of a small number of upper class businessmen, 
whose donation is also another major income source especially during elections. 
The targets of supply can more likely be differentiated from other parties. For 
ADPL and UDHK, in contrast, their more militant and grassroot image (more 
particularly the connection of UDHK and ASDMC) has effectively distant 
themselves from many rich people, who either afraid of "free-lunch" or of 
antagonism with China52. Due to the compressed space of the political arena, the 
likelihood for them to compete for identical sources of income is thus greatly 
enhanced. « . . � 
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V. Conclusion 
A note on theoretical consideration 
"The recent increase of interest in social 
movement has coincided with a crisis in, or in the 
case of functionalism the virtual collapse of such 
'single-order' systems of explanation. Increasing 
awareness of complexity, of social relations vis-a-vis 
single, coherent, but basically simple, explanatory 
systems has quite fundamentally altered social 
theory's conception of its role, and of what it can 
and cannot be expected to achieve. Sociology，a 
priorism'-the assumption that understanding the 
social world is in the first place dependent on an 
adequate theory-is giving way to a more humble 
conception of capacity of theory in aiding 
understanding." (Scott, 1990，p.4) 
"There are many practical reasons for the 
popularity of rational choices models in the study of 
collective behavior and social psychology. 
Paramount may be the fact that rational choice 
theory is a rich source for hypotheses that are 
precise enough to be falsifiable-which is often not 
true of competing theoretical approaches," (Turner, 
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1991, p.92) 
The present study is a theory—informed research. It is hoped that through 
some basic analytical tools and abstract principles, the concrete political 
phenomenon under the particular context of late transitional Hong Kong can be 
more systematically and meaningfully grasped. It is hoped that empirical 
research can transcend a mere gathering of disconnected facts or a pure 
description of ongoing events. 
However, to "conceptualize" or to "theorize" implies a sacrifice, the 
sacrifice of empirical richness and substantive content. A common problem often 
asked will be, do the. generalized and abstract schemes borrowed from 
academics under Western socio-cultural context be equally applicable here and 
then? Can historical uniqueness be easily neglected? Such questions, of course, 
are usually overlooked by students of sociology who possess the specific type of 
，vision，，the 'sociological imagination', or the capacity to understand the world 
through overwhelmingly and all-encompassing concepts and models. It is under 
this very habit, that empirical diversities and complexities of reality being 
removed from its deserved status. 
The problem, then becomes how can the. two poles-scattered empirical . . . . . ' • 
findings and grand conceptual schemes-be compromised and balanced? I think, 
氣. . . . 
it is suitable here again to raise the claim of "middle-range theories". Though it 
is not the context here to detail such meta-theoretical debates, some hints can 
still tentatively be prompted. 
First, the limitations of universalistic schemes probably does not lie in 
their 'abstraction，but rather in their，lack of precision，，to put it more directly, 
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their capabilities to generate testable and empirically relevant hypothesis or 
variables. The principal consideration is, again to raise here, the criteria of 
falsifiability. The very reason of adopting RMT as the central theme of this 
study, for instance, besides its coherence with the subject matter, is perhaps the 
relative accuracy and specificity of concepts it demonstrates. Though it will be 
too ambitious here to talk about strict linkages between theoretical propositions 
and empirical evidences (the inavailability of sufficient reliable indicators is a 
major difficulty), it is still hoped that through such preliminary study, that a self-
delimited and boundary-conscious framework of analysis, a clearly indicated 
direction of research, can be illustrated. 
Second, besides problems of the substantial，gap，between theory and 
reality, the format of theory construction is also an important matter. Why, in 
a word, should monolithic and holistic explanations predominate instead of 
allowing multiple causations or multiple dimensions of analysis? Why cannot 
some sort of typologies or classification schemes be more extensively adopted, 
so that the complicated and ever-changing concrete circumstances be understood 
more meaningfully at the same time without sacrificing the need for 
generalization? I think it would probably be a common misconception to equate 
the emphasis on context-specificity or conditional variations with empiricism or 
the denial of universal validations. As revealed in the present study, for instance, 
though situational constraints and coping strategies across political actors may 
be diversified, it is still hoped that they can be subsumed under some general 
categories as well as interpreted with reference to the same general institutional 
environment. In brief, all-encompassing schemes, if unable to inform 
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investigations in specific scenarios and substantive locations, its theoretical value 
will be greatly undermined. Instead of merely a statistical round-off, it should 
pay more attention to the substlity and contingency of especially the political 
reality. 
, ‘ . ‘ ‘ “ ‘ 
Empirical implications 
Returning to the subject matter, under the so called institutional choice 
perspective, how can the interorganizational relationships among liberal political 
parties be evaluated as a whole? What are the implications to the macro-power 
configuration (see Appendix I) in Hong Kong? Obviously, in line with the 
emphasis on context specific interaction and situational power dynamics, a more 
fluidic and emergent view of inter-party relationships has been developed. 
However, in the following, it is hoped that through a rough assessment of the 
relative weighting among various the variables, that a more comprehensive and 
clear picture can be displayed. 
Empirically, the relevance and impact of interorganizational linkages is 
gradually fading probably due to the increasing consolidation of movement 
organizations and development of political parties in the late transitional period. 
However, problems of autonomy and identity are issues so fundamental and 
crucial to organizational maintenance that they should not be dismissed easily, 
especially when internal stability of the parties are likely to be jeopardized by 
the increasingly turbulent external environment. Under such circumstances, the 
loyalty of the members may easily be shaken, and in order to preserve 
organization survival, political leaders may tend to boost internal morale and 
......:
:、.:. 135 . 
maintain organization integrity at the expenses of interorganizational 
relationships. Isolation and antagonism is thus expected. 
Comparatively speaking, problems concerning mobilization as well as 
external threats and opportunities can be demonstrated with greater amount of 
empirical evidences. \Vhile the former is constituted by huge number of specific 
and discrete events involving the need for continuous generation of 
organizational resources, the latter?s consequence is even more intrinsic and 
substantial in determining the basic orientations and mutual tendencies among 
the political parties. While one's impact can be directly felt and displayed over 
overt situations, the other is probably far more enduring and covering. 
Undoubtedly, concerning the realities of institutional constraint, the semi-
dependent nature of the polity and the ultimate control of power in hands of the 
upper authorities has made interactions between contenders and authorities an 
indispensable dimension of the strategic calculations among the power 
competitors. If attempts to crystallize mass support can never be a sufficient 
condition for power formation in Hong Kong, official acceptance will at least be 
the necessary condition of remaining in the game. Consequently, instrumental 
and unprincipled behaviour, characterized by mistruct and mutual jealousy 
among the contenders, tends to predominate and undermine political alignments. 
Specifically, China, as the future sovereign of the territory, the initiatives and 
steps she adopts in managing the local political leaders will be ultimately 
responsible in shaping the future power structure of Hong Kong. More 
concretely, the united front strategy she employs has much capacity in molding 
the preceptions and courses of actions among the leaders. Despite, little 
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concrete remarks can be derived in this area and the problem is farther 
complicated by the fluctuations of China's policies. 
On a whole, the collaboration relationship between MP and UDHK can 
by and large be preserved till then. Apparently, the avoidance of acute conflicts 
especially in the electoral situations and certain level of implicit product 
differentiation between them are crucial contributing factors. However, as MP 
gradually evolves as a more fall-shape political participatory force, the struggle 
for survival space in the all in all compressed political arena will unavoidably be 
intensified and future conflicts are fully possible. In order to establish its own 
unique image and domain of activities, MP also need to certain extent 
differentiate with UDHK. More importantly, however, schism will probably be 
most likely to occur over the dimension of relations with China. While the 
accommodative tendencies of MP will gradually strengthen and seemingly be 
rewarding, especially if its incentive is to "penetrate into the adminstration", 
isolation of UDHK not only tend to be preserved, but may even intensified by 
its increasing connections with the colonial establishment. The gap between the 
UDHK and the Chinese government will probably continue to be a deadlock 
which also plagues inter-party relationships, which is in fact not specifically 
rested upon the June-fourth incident. 
While for ADPL, the situation is to certain extent much the same. 
However, if the sources of tension tends to be solely external for MP, the 
conditions of ADPL's internal organizational environment will probably continue 
to be its origins of uncertainties. The contingencies of its orientations and 
strategies, largely due to the decentralized and personal dominated 
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organizational structure, and the subsequent impact on interorganizational 
relationships, being vastly discussed in above, will tend to be preserved unless 
complete organizational transformation takes place. In short, in order to fulfill 
the demands of the members, the party will choose to sacrifice relationships with 
other parties. Moreover, the close competition from UDHK and the inability to 
consolidate its support will also force it unavoidable from readjusting and 
relocating itself over time. 
Concerning relationships between MP and ADPL, there seems to be little 
things that have ever been talked about. This, though insufficiently, can partially 
reflect a kind of organizational indifference. Though there was once an occasion 
the two parties considered proposals of merger even after the formation of 
UDHK, in some cases conflicts especially in forms of electoral competition are 
still apparent. However, overall speaking the interaction is not intense. Basically, 
their relatively small scale and lack of concrete influences makes their 
relevances to each other minimal, neither does China's united front nor British 
cooptation produce a dividing effect between them. In brief, they both do not 
(or cannot�constitute a major threat as well as a crucial partner to each other. 
To farther conclude, the general adversary external conditions are 
unfavourable for the cooperation among the liberals. The strategic elites, being 
driven by rational initiatives, are likely be pushed into throat-cutting competition 
with each other under the limited arena, or seek for political patronage in an 
individualistic manner. Fragmentation and division along the party boundaries 
(or even within parties) are likely to continue and even intensify, though shifting 
coalescing activities based short-term and opportunistic considerations will also 
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be seen. With the gradual approaching of 1997, the capacity of China to 
selectively reward and sanction particular political actors will probably increase, 
the "free-floating" power available for open competition will further shrink, when 
considered together with the aroused aspirations of the liberals after the 1991 
elections, direct power confrontations and increased political distances among 
the original colleagues are not unpredictable. The inability of the liberals to 
form a solidary and disciplinary political forces, in turn, may on one hand greatly 
lower the possible polarization of political forces and manifestation of latent 
cleavages, on the other hand reduce the incentives of opponent party formations. 
Peculiarly enough, the fear of lose control and the need of direct intervention 
by China will also tend to be relieved, provided that other things being equal. 
i . . � 
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Footnotes 
Chapter I 
1. For farther discussions on the notion 'liberal political organizations' as well 
as its general properties and features in the context of Hong Kong, see Chapter 
n. 
2. Some major propositions of the present study are drawn from this essay: Zald 
and McCarthy (1980)，"Social Movement Industries: Competitions and 
Cooperations among SMOs". Jenkins (1983) sumarizes the defining 
characteristics of resource mobilization theory as follows, "These new 
perspectives emphasized the continuities between movement and 
institutionalized actions, the ratibnality of actors, the strategic problems 
confronted by movements..." Connecting with these, SMOs and the professional 
entrepreneurs involved are assigned central positions in the theory. The 
institutionalized routinized and established nature of movement is stressed. 
Ultimately, movements and parties, normal and adnormal politics are treated as 
merely different means to power and possess no qualitative differences. Such 
view is fully adopted in the present study onto the political organizations. 
3. Simmel is formost in op烂rationalizing the concept of "conflict". He treated it 
as a variable contingent to certain typical situations and also revealed the 
possible functions of conflicts towards group solidarities and systemic changes 
(see Turner, 1986). His, as well as later contributions of Coser provides genuine 
insights, but due to their fonnalistic and abstract nature, no direct applications 
will be attempted in this study. 
4. For futher discussions on the unit of analysis, see Chapter II. 
5. For further discussions on the rational choice approach and resource 
mobilization theory, see Chapter IV. The same arguments certainly are also 
applicable on other kinds of political organizations, which are however beyond 
the capacity of this study. 
6. For further discussions on related research problems, see also Chapter II. The 
list of interviewees is avaliable at Appendix 2. 
Chapter II 
1. For references to the definitions, see Davis and Roberts (1990) and Louie 
(1991a). The concept "political organization" is used vaguely similar to that by 
Wilson (1973). Other concepts are drawn mainly from conventional usage in 
Hong Kong. 
2. For greater details, see Leung (1986), Cheng (1989a), Wong (1989). 
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3. See Leung (1990) and also reportings in Pat Shing Semi-Monthly, 16-2-89. 
4. See Lui (1991) and reportings in Pat Shing Semi-Monthly, 16-2-90. 
5. Within the same period, another liberal quasi-party, Hong Kong Democratic 
Foundation, which, however, is constituted of strong foreign, upper-middle class 
elements, and possess public office holders from indirect elections, was also 
formed but it will not be detailed here. 
6. See, for example, interview of Martin Lee in Hong Kong Herald, 14-4-90 and 
interview of Yeung Sum in Contemporary’ 30-12-89. 
7. Wong Fu-wing, "The background and problems of liberal party formation", a 
series in Contemporary, 10-2-90 to 24-2-90. The author was on his personal 
opinion. One more word, ADPL is until now the member of ASDMC. 
8. The analytical scheme is based on preliminary observations and 
generalizations within the Hong Kong context. However, it can only be treated 
as a tool for conceptual clarification rather than substantive findings of this 
study. 
9. The Scheme is farther extended to all forms of political representation 
besides the political organizations discussed here in Chapter III.2, which further 
explores their structural locations in the institutional environment and the 
subsequent impact on their development. 
10. Both special terms used here draw from Lau (1990a). Suffice to the plentiful 
literature on this areas, the discussion here is made as brief as possible. 
11. Professor Lau Siu-kai employs the terms "utilitarian familism" to characterize 
the culture of Hong Kong Chinese, "minimally-integrated socio-political system" 
to characterize the structure of Hong Kong society and politics and "social 
accomodation of politics" to characterize the familial supporting system of the 
Chinese community in general (Lau, 1982，Lau and Ho, 1982). 
12. The criticism of Wong and Lui (1992) on Lau's overlook of class analysis is 
not grounded, see e.g. Lku, (1987，1990a). Although it may be asserted that 
these writings are contributed independently frorii the surveys on the political 
culture. Wong and Lui's treatment is also problematic in their selection of 
"domains of life"，which concentrates on concrete, material issues, seems to 
imply they can be the sole base for collective actions. 
13. So (1990) has conflated class with class-based organizations in her analysis 
of Hong Kong middle class. For more refined discussion, see e.g. Lui (1987， 
1990). ^ 
14. Little academic contributions can be found on this specific topic (except Lau 
& Kuan 1986b, Lau, 1990a, Louie, 1991b), partially due to the lack of concrete 
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research instruments. An exploratory elaboration is attempted here. One more 
word, Louie once comments on Cheung (1987) for his over-aspiration on the 
political role of the new middle class (1991b, p.7), such comment is also 
applicable to his account on the emergent politicians. 
15. A close but more condensed argument is found in Leung (1986). 
16. Lau (1990a) portraits the chairacter of "intellectual" activists (p.37) but in a 
different manner. 
17. Such characterization is extracted from the resource mobilization approach 
to problem of motivations in social movement participation. 
18. Lee (1989) also uses the same model to describe the political forces of Tuen 
Mun. Louie (1991b) offers other forms of typology which worth comparing. 
19. It should be reminded that political radicalism is not totally absent in Hong 
Kong. Student movement, for instance, have occasions of proliferation especially 
in 1970's. However, it is still poorly based, transitory and most of the activists 
have then become central established elites. 
20. Peculiar enough, nevertheless, Hirschman's logic does not hold in the sense 
that，sojourners，may be even more politically aggressive and critical towards 
China than 'stayers' due to their secured status (see Lau, 1990b). This though 
of course, does not imply any sense of political committment or responsibility 
at all. 
Chapter III 
1. Wong and Lui (1992) provide an alike argument in differentiating 
conceptualizations of political culture and social structure. While they focus on 
the class "structure" of the civil society，here the subject is the political 
"structure" of the state. 
2. Suffix to the sumptuous discussion of Lau (1988，1990a, 1992) and Kuan 
(1991), the presentation here will be made as brief as possible. 
3. The assumption underlying this analysis is that China will by and large be 
loyal to adopt the Basic Law (see Lau, 1988). 
4. It must also be admitted that Articles 17-19，158 have already gone through 
significant improvements favouring Hong Kong people when compared with an 
early version of draft Basic Law. 
5. Various institutional means include official appointments, electoral college 
and functional representations. The term "corporatist strategy丨丨 is employed by 
Scott (1989) to describe the semi-open political reform first initiated by the 
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Hong Kong government. 
6. See Lau (1988, p.33). The "governing coalition" is a loose alliance among 
established elites, pro-China forces, with China as the integrating factor. It will 
also be characterized by its internal contradictions, deideological and rational 
bases as well as its "demobilization" effects. 
7. See Lau (1990a, p.20-29) for the discussion of leadership policies of Britain 
and China. According to Lau, '150th parties have in fact independently pursued 
unstable and inconsistent leadership，policies，which divide the leaders and 
jeopardize their political future." (p.29) 
8.Such general journalistic comments, however, still lack support of conclusive 
academic reportings. 
9. The terminology employed in the figures are partially drawn from Lau 
(1990a) and Davis and Roberts (1990), though the usage here may be slightly 
changed without further specification. Again, the analytical scheme is based on 
preliminary observations and generalizations under the context of Hong Kong. 
However, it can only be treated as a tool for conceptual clarification rather than 
substantive findings, 
10. The diagrammatic presentation of Hong Kong political structure is partially 
reproduced from Kuan (1991，p,10). 
11. The division is based on general observations and conventional usage under 
the context of Hong Kong. For discussion, see Contemporary, 6-1-90, p.10-11; 1-
9-90, p.10-11; Nineties, 1-9-89, p.46-49. On a whole, though extremely lack of 
internal solidarity and united organizations, the groupings are stable in 
compositions overtime and the boundaries are relatively apparent. As the subject 
matter, liberals will be discussed more extensively here while the other two will 
serve as references. One more word, the division apparently cannot still include 
all the existing political forces in Hong Kong, to name some, the rural forces, 
the pro-KMT forces and the foreign forces, which will not be detailed here for 
the sake of simplicity. 
12. FTU and other pro-China leaders participated in the 1991 Legco direct 
election. Though failed to obtain any seats, they still performed quite 
satisfactorily. Further plans to form a united, grassroot pro-China party, named 
as Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), are under 
progress. 
13. For discussions on the future of CRC, see a series by Citi-Hung, Hong Kong 
Economic Journal, 11-11-91, 22-11-91, and 25-11-91. 
14. LDF had suffered from severe defeat in 1991 Legco Direct elections. It is 
generally thought to be because of the qualities of candidates, its inability to 
uphold a prominent image and the relative poverty in grassroot support. 
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Through the local connections with conservative oriented rural committees and 
Kai Fong Associations, however, its mobilization potential in future should not 
be overlooked. 
15. Surveys after half-year of Legco election shows public support of UDHK 
decreases 4%, see Ming Pao, 6-4-92. 
16. See "Decision of the NPC on the method for the formation of the first 
Government and first Legco of the Hong Kong SAR", a decision adopted 
together with the Basic Law in 1990，as well as Article 67 of Basic Law. 
17. Refer to note 8. 
18. Throughout the discussion, the emergent and fluidic character of China-
Hong Kong conflict as well as class conflict independent from the influences of 
political organizations is emphasized. Besides endogenous factors, they are 
contingent to, to name a few possibilities, the political and economic 
circumstances of China, global international dynamics and Sino-British 
relationship, as well as world economic cycles and trade conditions. 
19. Such viewpoint basically follows the logic developed by Olson (1965). For 
direct discussions on industrial actions, see Shorter and Tilly (1974). 
20. Among the 21 seats of functional election in 1991, only two, namely the 
teaching and health constitutencies, were returned with candidates of clear 
liberal support. 
Chapter IV 
1. Dunleavy (1991), for instance distinguishes "first principle analysis" (e.g. 
formalistic game theory) and iristitutipnal public choice" (e.g. Olsonian and 
Downsian theories) approaches, for which the former is bounded by highly 
hypothetical conditions and possess weak empirical implications while the latter 
provides a simplistic but concrete view which can apply to wide range of 
institutional context. The latter, realistic approach probably provides greater 
insights to the present study. 
2. For a preliminary discussion of RMT, refer to Chapter I, note 2. 
3. RMT can be viewed as an effort to solve the puzzle of free-rider problem 
raised by Olson (1965), through stressing on the role of SMOs and professional 
entrepreneurs in the formation of collective actors. In Scott's words, "while 
Olson's arguments strictly limit the possibility of collective action and successful 
mobilization, Oberschall [a leading RMT analyst] is more sanguine about the 
possibility of mobilization." (1990，p. 113) 
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4. One of the fundamental drawbacks of rational choice perspective in general, 
and of formalistic and axiomatic theories termed by Dunleavy (1991) as "first 
principle analysis" in specific, is its inability to deal with complex institutional 
settings. It is probably in debt to the tradition of economics which usually deals 
with idealized and strictly controlled institutional situations, e.g. the perfect 
market condition. 
5. To be fair, RMT here specifically denotes the professional entrepreneur 
model offered by McCarthy and Zald (1977 and 1987), which is contrasted to 
the political process model by Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982). Perrow (1979), 
for instance, refers them as RMII and RMI respectively, see also Pichardo 
(1988) for comparison. Undoubtedly, Tilly and McAdam lay greater stress on the 
institutional environment and opportunity structures. Their applicability to the 
present study on the multi-organizational field, however, is still minimal. 
6. The contribution of Garner and Zald (1987)，to some extent, can be viewed 
as an important step supplementing this theoretical niche. 
7. The conceptions here contrasts Granovetter (1985) in two sense, however. 
First, the present study takes organization as the basic unit in political process 
diverges from strict methodological individualism. For discussion, see Hindess 
(1984 and 1989). Second, the strict rationality assumption based on "narrow 
utilitarian pursuit of self-interest" imported from the economics tradition, which 
is criticized by Granovetter, will still be adopted in the is study. For arguments, 
see previous paragraphs. 
& Other related works include Aveni (1978)，Curtis and Zurcher (1973)，Gerlach 
and Hine (1970)，Barkan (1986), Gusfield (1966)，Nelson (1974), Walsh (1982) 
Diani and Lodi (1988) and Rucht (1989). In general, they all share common 
roots in organization theory, but it should be emphasized that they cannot be 
subsumed under the common label of RMT as a whole. 
9. Refer to Chapter II for a historical description. 
10. In the rest of the essay, abbreviated forms of the hypothesis codes drawn 
from Zald and McCarthy (1980) will be used, e.g. here "H8" denotes "Hypothesis 
8". ^ 
Simmel and Coser have far before revealed such logic of which external 
conflict promotes internal solidarity. See^Turaer, 1986. 
11. It should be pointed out, that such account provides a vague 
conceptualization rather than operationalizable hypothesis. For how much threat 
or opportunity will be significant enough to promote cooperation is remaining 
unclarified. 
12. From a different point of view, however, such phenomenon also reflects the 
individualistic and elitist mentality of the liberals.，Political stars' with high 
visibilities stand out while minor supporting activists fall behind. Attempts of 
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monopolizing upper positions in ASDMC were constantly heard and 
consequently, Wong Wai-hung, one of the liberal leaders, broke his relationship 
with the grouping permanently. 
13. See So (1990) as well as reportings in HKS, 24-8-89 and SCMP, 3-9-89. 
14. This situation can be analogous to H l l of Zald and McCarthy (1980), "If the 
funding situation is selecting one among many proposals from different SMOs, 
conflict is encouraged..." 
15 Wide Angle, 15-10-90. See also reportings in Contemporary, 1-9-80, 8-9-90 and 
24-11-90, as well as commentaries of Yuen Yat-Chou, Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, 10-10-90 and 24-10-90. 
16. Contemporary, 15-10-91. 
17. For the concept of "level of institutionalization" employed specifically here, 
see Panebianco (1988). 
18. It should altogether be reminded that favorable changes in China does not 
imply UDHK can also easily repair its relations with China. In fact, the "radical" 
and "conflictual" strategies of many liberals before June-fourth have already 
been perceived by China as malevolent in nature. 
19. For background of Law Cheutig-kwok and details of the incident, see Pat 
Shing Semi-Monthly’ 1-9-90 and 1-10-90, but also commentaries of Louie Kin-
shuen in Contemporary, 12-1-91 and 19-1-91, The case will farther be discussed 
in Chapter IV.3. 
20. Fung Kin-kee, chairman of ADPL, has already openly revealed his 
inclination to accept the appointment in future. See News File, 18-3-92. 
However, it should also be pointed out that the appointment may not be directly 
divisive among the liberals, Szeto Wah and Martin Lee were once also the 
members of Basic Law Drafting Committee under the control of Peking, 
21. The appointment of Fung, though minimally affecting inter-party 
relationships, has in effect caused much criticism from grassroot pressure groups. 
• • . • . � . 
22. Pat Shing Semi-Monthly, 1-10-91，p.31, 
23. Refer to note 14. 
24. The appointment can, of course, by individual base but in effect, it still 
indicates substantial alternation to UDHK as long as Martin Lee holds central 
positions in it. 
25. The analysis of the contributors may not totally be coherent with what is 
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trying to argue here, but what is significant is the revealed underlying logic. 
26. ADPL, besides the three nominees, also supported a non-member close 
colleague, Leung Yin-chung, in NT South against UDHK candidates. Only one 
of them returned. MP, together with the success in the December supplementary 
election, has all three candidates elected into Legco. 
27. See interviews with Cheung Ping-leung in Hong Economic Times, 23-8-90, 
Hong Kong Economic Journal, 7-10-90 and Ming Pao, 24-9-90. 
28. See evolvements between MP's "Declaration in 1990，s", late 1989 and "Green 
Paper on Party Development", early 1992. 
29. For further discussions on the dynamics of liberal parties in Legco, see 
Chapter IV.3. 
30. Refer to note 25. 
31. The next section will be devoted to the discussions on competition for 
resources and audiences. 
32. The relative low level of institutionalization among the pressure groups, 
however, sharply constrast with the parties. They are, roughly speaking, either 
dependent on parties and totally submit their autonomy, or to different extent 
trying to distant themselves from parties and attempt to develop distinctive 
identities of their own. 
33. No overlap of membership is however reported between MP and ADPL. 
34. Gamson (1975), for instance, defines acceptance (recognition by authorities) 
and new advantage (material reward, policy change) as two major criteria of 
movement "success". Such view is more or less adopted here. 
35. Jenkins (1983)，for instance, examines typologies like tangible or intangible, 
instrumental or infra as well as power or mobilizing resources. He however, 
finds that these typologies are often too abstract and difficult to apply. See also 
Freeman (1979) and Tilly (1978) for related discussions. 
36. Pichardo (1988) pinpoints the organizational dilemma of preserving 
autonomy or receiving external resources, especially faced by lower class 
movement organizations. The same problem is probably also encountered by the 
grassroot and locally situated political organizations in Hong Kong, on a whole, 
in considering their relationships with more formalized parties. 
37. Discussions in below are in debt to Dr. Stephen Tang Lung-wai. 
38. NT East: internal disputes of UDHK as well as competition with 
independent liberal Emily Lau. 
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NT West: clash between MP and ADPL in the December supplementary 
election. 
NT North: ADPL confronted an ally of MP and UDHK. 
NT South: ADPL supported colleague confronted with UDHK. 
Kowloon West: ADPL twin candidates confronted UDHK. 
39. Kowloon East found the solidly based pro-China Kwun Tong "Man Chung" 
Association. While Kowloon Central located not only the headquarters of FTU, 
but also situated the active East Kowloon Residents Association as well as a 
member of individual pro-China figures. 
40. One of the major forces constituted ADPL is Shumsuipo People's Livelihood 
Concern Group active in that area since early. 
41. See Louie Kin-sheun's analysis in Contemporary, 12-1-91. 
42. Refer to note 27. 
43. See Hong Kong Economic Times’ 9-12-91, Hong Kong Economic Journal，5-1-
92 and Pat Shing Semi-Monthly, 1-12-91. 
44. The same point is also admitted officially in MP's "Green Paper on Party 
Development", early 1992. 
45. This partially resembles Claus Offe's characterization of new middle class 
politics, "New middle-class politics is, in contrast to most working-class as well 
as old middle-class politics, typically a politics of a class, but not on behalf of a 
class." (1987, p.77) — ‘ 
46. Again, if the trend for MP is to adopt a more localistic and election oriented 
image, its overlap and tension of competition with other two will certainly 
increase. Moreover，the tactical disagreements between it and others, if being 
applied onto the same narrow constituents, are also inducive to conflict. 
47. The incorporation of Law Cheung-kwok, being with intellectual and upper-
middle class background, as well as Fung-kin-kei's entering of Housing 
Authority, has in fact gradually moderated the image of ADPL. 
48. See Cheng (1989a), Kwan and Lau (1988, p. 13) as well as their citation of 
Emily Lau in Far Eastern Economic Review, 24-10-84. 
49. See a preliminary discussion in Pat Shing Semi-Monthly, 16-2-1989. Due to 
its image and tactical overlap with UDHK, the problem of media exposure 
seems to be more intense for ADPL, though no concrete indicators can be 
derived. 
50. See reportings in Hong Kong Economic Times, 16-S-90 and Ming Pao, 28-10-
90. 
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51. A typical member of ADPL is a social worker, although quite a number of 
grassroot activists, which probably lack of money resources, are also 
incorporated. 
52. During the formation stage of UDHK, no single dollar can be raised from 
capitalists. However, its seem-to-be financial healthiness at early (which enabled 
it to buy a permanent headquarter) has drawn speculations of possible external 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































List of Interviewees 
Code Occupation Organization and position 
Dr. Lt University lecturer MP founding member & 
exco member 
Dr. Ck Polytechnic lecturer MP exco member 
Nlr. L Solicitor, former UC member MP vice-chairman 
Mr. Hs Community officer MP member & full-time 
staff 
Mr, T Social worker, Legco member MP member 
Mr. Fh University lecturer MP founding member, 
former SOCO director 
Dr. W University lecturer MP member 
Mr* W Civil engineer ADPL founding member & 
exco member 
*Mr. Fk Legco member ADPL chairman 
*Dr. Lc Economist, former Legco ADPL member 
candidate 
Mr. L Social worker, DB member ADPL member 
Mr. Cy Student activist Former ADPL member 
Mr. Ck Community officer UDHK full-time staff 
Mr. Hh Director of SOCO 
Ms.T Officer of CTU 
Mr. Ch Primary school teacher Chief secretary of PTU, 
founding member of 
UDHK 
‘ . « > 
Ms. W University administrator Head of woman's group, 
founding member of 
UDHK, former exco 
member of ASDMC 
Mr. Cs Graduate Student Exco-member of church-
related social concern 
group 




1. Please briefly introduce yourself and your participation experiences in the particular 
party. 
2. In general, how do you perceive the interrelationships between your party and other 
libersd parties in Hong Kong? 
3. What do you think are the major fators affecting such relationships? 
4. What is the mass base of your party? Can it be clearly differentiated from that of 
other parties? 
5. Do you think that the present geographically based election system favors your party? 
What are your criteria of selecting candidates? 
... . • 
6. Does your party specialise in particular field? What specific tactics are usually 
employed for mobilization of support? Can they be differentiated from other parties? 
7. Do you consider media as ail important means of mobilization? Are you satisfied with 
the level of media exposure of your party? What are the stratgies of improving 
popularity? 
8. What is the major source of party income? Is there any financial problem? Are the 
income sources of various parties likely to overlap? 
9. Is overlapping membership still a common phenomenon in your party? What are the 
roles of these members in your party? 
10. Do you think that there is a united front among the liberals in facing the upper 
authorities? 
11. Is your party a member of ASDMC? Do you think China-Hong Kong conflict 
constitutes a threat to party development? 
12. What is your opinion of the frequent meetings between Hong Kong elites and top 
Chinese officials? What is your opinion of the appointments of Consultants on Hong 
Kong affairs? Do you think that UDHK can recovered from being isolated? 
13. What is your opinion of appointing liberal leaders into the Exco? What are the 
possible consequences on party development? 
14. Do your party's members occupy any other positions in the decision making bodies? 
Do you think this will create a dilemma for the party which have to be accountable to 
152 
the mass? 
15. Before and after 1991 direct election, do you think that opponent political forces 
constitute significant threat to your party? What will you predict on the future of these 
foces as well as your interactions with them? 
• • • ' • • ^ , ‘ ’ ' .
 1 ：. 
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Appendix 4 
Abbreviations 
RMT Resource Mobilization Theory 
SMO Social Movement Organization 
MP Meeting Point 
ADPL Association for Democrazy and People's Livelihood 
UDHK United Democrats of Hong Kong 
ASDMC Alliance in Support of the Patroitic Democratic Movement in China 
JCPDG Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government 
,• . ‘ “ 
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